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This paper reports research undertaken in the "Sonderfor-
schungsbereich 86" (Hamburg-Kiel) "Teilprojekt A1"
(Wachstum und Beschaftigung in Entwicklungslandern) with
financial support provided by the •'Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft".1. Industrialization and Policy-induced Distortions
Mexico has sustained unusual rates of real income growth
(6.4 % of average annual GDP growth between 19 50 and 1970)
by following an economic policy giving first priority to
manufacturing industries. Import substitution has been the
dominating trade strategy since the late 1940s with only
cautious steps to a more export oriented strategy since the
2
mid-19 60s. Mexico has not been spared the wellknown problems
of regional and sectoral" imbalances
:|, a skewed personal in-
come distribution and unemployment accompanying the indus-
trialization of other developing countries. Beginning with
the presidentship of Diaz Ordaz (1966-70) the "attenuation"
of imbalances and inequities is proclaimed as a specific policy
goal in plan documents, while employment creation is added to
the list in the Echeverria administration.
Although based on another stratum of the Mexican political
economy the stepwise execution of a massive land reform has
4
obvious complementary effects to the industrial policy.
L. Miiller-Ohlsen, Importsubstitution und Exportdiversifi-
zierung im Industrialisierungsproze/3 Mexikos - Strategien,
Ergebnisse, Perspektiven. Kieler Studie No. 129,
Tubingen 19 74.
2
L. Miiller-Ohlsen, op.cit.; J.B. Donges and L. Miiller-Ohlsen,
AuBenwirtschaftsstrategien und Industrialisierung in Ent-
wicklungslandern. Kieler Studie No. 157, Tubingen 1978;
B. Balassa, Policy Reform in Developing Countries.
Pergamon Press, 19 77, Chapter 2: Foreign Trade and Indus-
trial Policy in Mexico, pp. 31-49.
3
L. Soils, Planes de desarrollo economico y sociales en
Mexico, Mexico, D.F., 19 75.
4
B. Fischer, Agrarwirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Agrar-
politik - Mexiko 19 60-1975. Kiel Working Papers, No. 88,
March 19 79.- 2 -
The agricultural sector absorbs much of the fast growing labor
force which cannot be employed in the more capital-intensive
industries under socially acceptable conditions. The land
reform allows for a minimum wage and a working conditions
policy in urban regions without increasing the urban unemploy-
ment to a level where it would disrupt the political system.
Land reform and minimum wages help to keep political stability
despite the social strains created by rapid industrialization
as well as population growth.
Trade policies, land reform and minimum wages have gains and
costs in terms of real income, employment and equity. The same
is true for alternative policies on production, factor inputs
and regional distribution. The purpose of this paper is to
quantify the welfare effects of the various policies, to
identify the trade-offs individual policies have with respect
to the different dimensions of welfare (policy goals) and to
point out combinations of policies which are more efficient
in attaining the goals and in avoiding trade-offs.
The policies pursued up to 1970 induced a set of distortions
which may be summarized as follows:
1. Domestic and foreign rates of transformation between
2
tradable goods differ. In 1970 the nominal implicit
protection of tradables varies between 17.2 % in manu-
facturing, 1.1 % in agriculture and -8.7 % in mining.
In 1970 the agricultural sector absorbs 39.4 % of the labour
force although contributing only 11.6 % to the GDP. The main
beneficiaries of the land reform, the communal land-owning
entities (ejidos), account for 65.2 % of the agricultural
labor force.
2
See A. Waarts, A. Ten Kate, R.B. Wallace, La Protecciqn
Nominal en la Economia Mexicana: Su medicion para 1970.
Investigation Economica, Vol. XXXV (197.6), No. -138,
pp. 237-303.- 3 -
Given a general protection for manufacturing further
distortions arise from intra-industrial and from intra-
agricultural differences in effective rates of protection.
Concerning manufacturing differences in nominal implicit
rates are more pronounced than required on account of inter-
mediate consumption to equalize effective protection.
Inside the agricultural sector cereal producers snjoy a
positive protection whilst the producers of other food
crops, animal products and agricultural raw materials face
a negative protection. Inside manufacturing the domestic
production of industrial intermediates, investment goods
and consumer durables is effectively more protected than
the rest.
Social marginal product values of labour differ between
regions. Minimum wages are nondistorting insofar as differ-
ences between regions and work categories reflect differ-
ences in living costs and in the quality of labour. The
distorting effect arises from fixing the general wage level
above the free market level thus either causing unemployment
or depressing the wage level in regions or sectors rr'r
adhering to the rules. A strict control of adherence .to
i^'imum wage legislation is - if at all - only possible
in urban regions with the exception of the self-employed
or of firms employing mainly family labour. Since job
searchers improve their chance of obtaining a position
in the "formal sector", where minimum wages and protection
against dismissal apply, search unemployment or search
underemployment in the urban "informal" sector occur.
J.R. Harris and M.P. Todaro, Migration, Unemployment and
Development: A Two Sector Analysis. The American Economic
Review, Vol. 60, Menasha, Wise. 1970, pp. 1.26-142._ 4 -
3. Social marginal product values of labour differ between
sectors in rural regions. Private costs of intersectoral
migration arise out of, i.a., individual preferences for
types of work and the obsoleteness of sector-specific
qualifications on migration. In an industrializing economy
these costs lower the opportunity costs of agricultural
labour.
The land reform policy adds to this autonomous distortion
by causing private migration costs to the migrant (in terms
of land and capital income foregone). Land is redistributed
from large private holdings mainly to villages ("ejidos")
which in turn distribute easement rights to individual
members at no costs to the tiller. The ejidatario is neither
allowed to sell nor to lease the land. Should he migrate, he
looses all income from the land and from durable invest-
ments (irrigation, plantations). The minimum size of indi-
vidual holdings in ejidos secures a total factor income
above the labour income on private farms thus causing a
waiting list of applicants for ejido membership. However,
the minimum size is too low to allow the marginal value
product of labour to be on an"equal level with private farms,
4. Social marginal value products of capital differ between
sectors. The industrialization policy reduces capital costs
particularly to "new" and "necessary" industries by tariff
exemptions for imported investment goods, profit tax exemp-
tions, depreciation allowances, preferential access to low
interest rate credits, direct investments in state enter-
prises, the approval of direct foreign investments. The
agricultural policy reduces capital costs by public irri-
gation investments. Since private large farms are concen-
trated in the semi-arid regions suitable for irrigation,
these farms benefit from water services supplied at reduced
costs "
i^
N the consumer more than ejidal and private small
farms concentrated in the rain-fed regions.-. 5 -
In addition to the policy-induced distortion, the regional
limits to labour mobility in a large and ethnically heteroge-
nous country must be taken into account as an autonomous dis-
tortion. Psychic and material costs of migration between north
and south seem to be prohibitive. The sustained overpropor-
tional economic growth of the north raised northern rural wages
on a level more than twice that of the southern rural wages.
Since minimum wages are less differentiated, this also implies
that rural-urban wage differentials and urban underemployment
2
are more pronounced in the south.
A further autonomous distortion arises between rural and urban
areas. The unequal regional distribution of complementary
private and public services causes a locational advantage of
urban areas particularly for investment in manufacturing.
Industrial firms can realize private gains from the local
affinity to financing and commercial institutions, which are
concentrated in urban centers, and from permanent contacts to
central branches of public administration which are necessary
to settle the manifold problems in connection with the import
of foreign technology, restricted availability of foreign
currency, application for preferences, etc. Such externalities
distort industrial productivity levels to the disadvantage of
rural areas.
In cases of multiple distortions the effects of interventions
on policy goals are not determined analytically. Policy proposals
made in studies on trade and industrialization, agrarian policy
This conclusion is based on evidence from the 1970 population
census. While there is significant migration between Mexican
states with more urban or more rural structures hardly any
(net-) migration is observed between the north and the south.
For the definitions of north and south see Table 1.
o
F.W. Young, D.K. Freebairn, R. Snipper, The Strucutal Context
of Rural Poverty in Mexico; A Cross-State Comparison.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.27 (1979),
pp. 669-686.
M. Bruch, Landliche Industrialisierung, regionaler technolo-
gischer Dualismus und X-Faktoren^ Eine Untersuchung am Bei-
spiel der Verarbeitenden Industrie Mexikos. Kiel Working
Papers, No. 92, July 1979.- 6 -
as well as on employment and equity problems face the general
reservation that a reduction in one distortion need not be
welfare increasing. The reservation can only be met with a
quantitative general equilibrium model. Chapter 2 characterizes
the application of a Johansen-type model to Mexico, Chapter 3
reports the econometric or numerical specification. The compa-
rative-static results for agricultural and industrial policies
are presented and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively,
whereas Chapter 6 draws preliminary conclusions.
2. The Structure of the Model
The model has to be disaggregated with respect to products,
sectors of production and regions in a way which enables the
market distortions and the various economic policies to be
analysed.
Products
Largely diverging rates of effective protection among different
product categories require a thorough disaggregation of agri-
cultural, mining and manufacturing outputs (Table 1). Products
(1) to (10) are considered as "tradables" while private services
(including construction) and public services are treated as
"non-tradable" or "local goods". Trade in private services is
assumed to consist of distribution services embodied in foreign
trade with other goods. The quantity relation between traded
goods and distribution services is kept constant. Products (13)-
(16) are introduced as separate categories for reasons which
will be explained in connection with output supply.
The system of equations will be documented in the final
study of the research project.- 7 -
Regions
The purpose of the regional breakdown of the model is to
account for the above described rural-urban dualism in labour
and capital markets. Since according to per capita income and
degree of industrialization two major industrial agglomerations
are discernible (Distrito Federal and Nuevo Leon), the Mexico
economy is subdivided into two regional entities; the north and
the south (see Table 1). Within each region a differentiation
between rural and urban areas is introduced at the district
(municipio) level. Each municipio, located either in the north-
eastern or in the central part of the country (see Table 1),
which in 1970 contained a town with at least 50.000 inhabitants,




The supply of agricultural products (1-4) cannot be described
by product-specific production functions because the respective
inputs for each output are not known. Instead, separable multi-
output production functions with constant returns to scale on
both the output and the input side are specified. In these,
aggregate output is a function of product quantities, aggregate
input is a function of factor quantities and of total factor
productivity, and aggregate output equals aggregate input. The
output unit is determined by the ratios of producer's prices,
the input mix by the ratios of factor prices - unless factors
are allocated directly. Labour, irrigated land (including
For details see G. Hasenkamp, Specification and Estimation
of Multiple-Output Production Functions. Lecture Notes on
Economics and Mathematical Systems, No. 12o, Berlin, Heidel-
berg, New York 1976.- 8 -
installations) non-irrigated land and "industrial intermediates
for agricultural production" (except animal feed) are considered
as substitutable factors. Product-specific intermediates like
animal feed, own intermediates and services enter via partial
Leontief-functions. Under the separability assumption, product-
specific factors like animal stocks and plantations must be
treated like product-specific intermediates. The extension of
the multi-output function by partial Leontief-functions, in
effect, means that the producer's prices determining the output
mix are product prices net of product-specific taxes and costs
of intermediates and factor services.
Differences in topography, climate and quantity of soil require
a further disaggregation of rural areas. Each of the two rural
regions defined is divided into two agricultural regions (see
Table 1). For the purpose of our analysis, agriculture is
further broken down institutionally in each of these regions
into ejidos, private small farms and private large farms.
Altogether, the model contains input and output functions for
12 agricultural subsectors.
Non-agricultural Activities
Output supply of products 5-12 is determined by regional sector-
specific production functions. Labour and capital are considered
as substitutable factors, fixed coefficients govern the relation
between intermediates and output. In manufacturing industries
(6-10) production is described by CES-functions whereas Cobb-
Douglas functions are applied for mining, extraction of crude
oil and private services. Supply of public services equals by
definition the public final consumption (i.e. wages and salaries,
depreciation and consumption of intermediate inputs); the regio-
nal distribution of public services is considered to be deter-
mined politically.- 9 -
Table 1 - Product Classification and Regional Differentiation
A Product Classification
1 Plant products: cereals
2 : other food
3 : raw materials
4 Animal products
5a Crude oil and natural gas
5b Mining and petrochemicals
6 Processed food, beverages, tobacco
7 Traditional consumer goods
8 Industrial intermediates
9 Chemicals
10 Investment goods and consumer durables
11 Private services (incl. energy and construction)
12 Public services
13 Tradable capital goods













Baja California, Baja California T.,
Nayarit, Sinaloa, Sonora
Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Kuevo
Leon, San Luis Potosl, Tamaulipas,.
Zacatecas
Aguascalientes, D.F., Guanajuato,
Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan,
Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro, Tlaxcala
Campeche, Colima, Chiapas, Guerrero,
Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco,
Veracruz, Yucatan- 10 -
The Mexican input-output table treats tourism and border
industries as sectors without value added (i.e. without factor
inputs). "Production" in value terms of these sectors, which is
entirely exported, is simply the sum of sectoral outputs con-
sumed by foreign tourists or exported under the "Border Indus-
trialization Programm". The model copies the input-output table
with respect to these goods (15, 16). In the same way "tradable
capital goods" (13) and "industrial intermediates for agri-
cultural production" (14) are simply the sum of industrial
outputs which are either used for investment purposes or as
intermediate inputs into agriculture. In each of these four
artificial sectors the quantity mix is kept constant.
Product Demand
In the specification of macro-models for open economies, an
"intra-trade" problem usually arises; even with a highly dis-
aggregated product classification there are simultaneously
imports and exports within individual product groups. Obviously,
the assumption of homogeneity between domestically produced
and imported goods, which is generally made in trade theory,
cannot be maintained. One way of approaching the problem is
to distinguish between competitive and non-competitive imports.
The latter would be summed up in a separate product group so
that in the remaining product groups foreign trade merely
consists of net-exports or net-imports of competitive goods.
The procedure is, however, characterized by a high degree of
arbitrariness, it must neglect parts of the trade flows even
if an appropriate product classification is chosen. Such dis-
advantages are not acceptable for a model designed to analyse
trade policies. With the exception of cereals, domestically
produced and imported goods are, therefore, regarded as imperfect
2
substitutes. The domestic consumption good is treated as a
1 See Chapter 3, pp. 18-19.
2
Trade in cereals is completely determined by intervention.- 11 -
1 CES-aggregate of imports and domestic goods. An elasticity
of substitution equal to or smaller than -1 means that the
value share of imports in domestic consumption is constant or
increases, respectively, when the ratio between import prices
and domestic prices declines.
Domestic consumption is comprised of intermediate demands of
firms and of the public sector, changes in inventories, capital
investment and private final consumption. Given fixed technical
coefficients, intermediate demand immediately follows from
domestic gross output. Inventories are fixed in a constant ratio
to domestic consumption since business cycles are not considered
in the model. Total investment equals savings. The distribution
of total investment between machinery and construction depends
on the sectoral composition of total investment, since the compo-
sition of invested capital is allowed to vary among sectors of
production. Private final consumption is described by regional
consumption functions depending on prices and expenditures.
Market equilibrium of domestically produced tradables (except
for cereals) is achieved through exports. The producer's price
of these domestically produced goods is determined by the
respective world market price, the exchange rate and (net-)
export subsidies. Demand for exports is considered infinitely
price elastic. Domestic prices of imported goods are determined
by their foreign prices, the exchange rate and the implicit
rate of protection. Sellers' prices of the (combined) domestic
consumption goods, are calculated as weighted averages of both
prices.
For details of this specification in general equilibrium
models see J. de Melo, K. Dervis, S. Robinson, Planning
Models and Development Policy (forthcoming), Chapter 5:
Foreign Trade and Trade Policy; P. Armington, A Theory of
Products Distinguished by Place of Production, Staff Papers,
Vol. 16 (1969), pp. 159-178.- 12 -
There can be no national market for local goods. The model
contains separate commodity balances for the four regions and,
hence, different regional equilibrium prices for private serv-
ices. This implies different regional prices for constructions;
Factor Inputs
Labour input in the private sector of the economy except for
ejidos is governed by the marginal productivity condition. The
same condition applies to industrial intermediate inputs in the
12 agricultural subsectors and to capital input in the formal
sector of manufacturing and private services. The use of non-
irrigated land for agricultural production as well as the labour
input in ejidos is determined exogenously by the land reform
policy.
Furthermore, public investment in irrigation decides upon the
input or irrigated land into agricultural production, private
agricultural investment complementary to public investment and
additionally irrigated land is taken in equal parts from un-
cultivated and from non-irrigated, cultivated land. Concerning
mining and extraction of crude oil capital input is also consid-
ered as exogenously determined since it depends on political
decisions about the intensity of exploitation of known deposits
and on successful exploration of new deposits.
The Capital Market
Firms belonging to the formal sector of manufacturing and
private services have access to a uniform national capital
market, which keeps the intersectoral and interregional rela-
tions of interest rates - net of taxes and subsidies - constant.
Differences in net interest rates reflect - among other things -
differences in expected risks. In addition to interest rates,
capital costs vary between sectors and' regions due to differ-
ences in taxes and subsidies, in depreciation rates and in
prices for buildings. Supply on the capital market is equal to- 13 •-
the total non-agricultural capital stock less the capital
invested in mining and extraction of crude oil. The capital
stock is enlarged by net investment which is the balance be-
tween private, public and foreign savings on the one hand and
investment in agriculture and inventories on the other hand.
The savings propensity from wage income (after taxes) is set
constant while private savings from capital and profit income
is assumed to vary with interest rates. Public savings are a
constant share of public consumption and the share of agri-
culture in total public investment is considered as a poli-
tical decision. Finally, foreign savings, i.e. the deficit
in the trade balance, are treated as an exogenous variable.
The Labour Market
The labour market is more fragmented than the capital market.
First of all, migration is allowed between rural and urban
areas, but not between the north and the south. Total labour
supply in the north as well as in the south does not respond
to wage changes (northern supply is, however, diminished by
exogenous determined migration to the U.S.). The northern
and the southern labour market are each divided into four
segments due to the minimum wage legislation and to agrarian
reform policies? ejidos, other rural sectors, formal and
informal urban sectors. Labour input in ejidos and wage rates
in the formal sector of urban areas are determined by the
land reform and the minimum wage legislation, respectively.
Open unemployment is avoided by the adjustment of the free
wage rates. The distribution between "rural" and "urban under-
employment" is governed by a Harris-Todaro equilibrium condition
according to which urban wage rates expected by migrants have
to match expected rural wages. Expected urban wages are defined
as averages of minimum and informal wages weighted respectively
See Chapter 1, p. 5.- 14 -
with the probability of a new migrant obtaining a formal job
("employment probability') or remaining underemployed. Safe-
guards against dismissal of industrial and service employees
limit the employment probability to the ratio between either
newly created or - due to natural fluctuation - vacant jobs
to the number of underemployed in the urban informal sector.
The expected rural wage rate, on the other hand, is equal to
the average wage in non-ejido agriculture. In this connection,
it is important to note that applicants to ejidos are not
required to live in the respective rural area.
The Problem of Specialization
In multi-sectoral general equilibrium models of an open
economy, constant or increasing returns to scale- and economy-
wide markets for all factors induce a specialization of the
economy on merely a few industrial manufactures, In addition,
a regional disaggregation of the model might give rise to an
almost complete regional specialization although this tendency
is mitigated by linkages with the local sector and could further
be reduced if transportation costs were accounted for. One
possible solution of this problem would be to hold sectoral
capital stocks constant and to limit the focus of the analysis
on short term development. That excludes, however,, the testing
of some of the more relevant hypotheses and it is questionable
whether business cycle fluctuations may be neglected in such a
model. Another suggestion to ignore econometric estimates and
simply assume decreasing returns to scale in manufacturing is
L. Taylor, S. Black, Practical General Equilibrium
Estimation of Resource Pulls under Trade Liberalization,
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 4 (1974),
pp. 37«53.15 -
even more unsatisfactory,, Production elasticities of labour
and capital are then determined by the wage share and as resi-
duals, respectively.
In reality, even, with perfect factor markets and non-inter-
vention of government into the sectoral or regional structure,
constant or increasing returns to scale do not lead to a com-
plete sectoral or regional specialization since the intersec-
toral or interregional migration of entrepreneurial families
has private costs in terms of the absoluteness of sector or
region-specific knowledge or capabilities and of personal pref-
erences unfulfilled. In the model we take these costs into
consideration when specifying the factor demand equations, i.e.
we assume subjectively decreasing returns to scale. Unlike the
de Ilelo model, however, the supply equations are specified
according to the production function estimates. The model thus
softens the sectoral and regional specialization without ig-
noring the observed supply relationships.
Public Budget
Budgetary implications of policy interventions (taxes and
subsidies on income, factor inputs, imports and exports) are
captured in the budget equation. Thus, they are interconnected
with public consumption and savings. The value added share in
public final consumption is held constant.
Price Index and Balance of Payments
The price index of gross domestic product at market prices
serves as a numeraire in the model. Implicitly we assume
monetary policy to fix the general price level without influ-
encing other variables of the model.
J. de Melo, A Multi-Sector, Price-Endogenous Trade Model
Applied to Colombia. The Johns Hopkins University, Ph.D.,
1975.16 -
In 1976 Mexico switched from fixed to flexible exchange rates.
Before that date, balance of payments equilibrium was main-
tained by short-term fluctuations of capital imports and by
quantitative restrictions on imports of manufactures. In our
model balance of payments equilibrium is achieved by an endo-
genously determined exchange rate which adjusts imports and
exports to an exogenously fixed capital import. Some of the
more interesting results of the model on the trade-off between
real income and industrialization depend on the balance of pay-
ments equation. In the final chapter, however, it is shown that
the results will not differ crucially in the case of a fixed
exchange rate with fluctuating capital imports. Only in the
case of a balance of payments equilibrium kept by trade inter-
ventions the results will be basically different.
Welfare Indicators
Real income and industrialization targets are easily oper-
ationalized as gross domestic product at market prices and as
share of manufacturing industries in gross domestic product
at factor costs. These definitions are in general agreement
with the goals in Mexican development plans.
Since population is not determined endogenously in the model,
it is not necessary to compute national per capita income sep-
arately. Concerning the regional imbalances the major goal
consists of lowering the income gap between the metropolitan
area (the urban south) and the rural regions with particular
emphasis on the poor rural south. The "success" of various
policies in this respect is indicated by the relation of rural
per capita income to per capita income in the urban south
("regional equity").
In describing the global goal of equalizing the Mexican income
distribution we refrained from a computation of indices for
the size distribution of personal income. This would require
a dubious attempt to ascribe the functional incomes in individual
sectors and regions to various size-classes of household income.- 17 -
Furthermore, according to the political economy of the Mexican
"institutional revolution'
3 the goal of distributional equity
is rather related to the relative income position of major
social classes than of individuals. These social classes can
be detected in the functionally, sectorally and regionally
disaggregated income system of the model. They consist of the
vejidatarios", the working class in general and, as a partic-
ularly sensible group, the rural and the urban underemployed,
which do not fall under the minimum wage and dismissal regu-
lations.
This catalogue suggests that neither an artifically constructed
macro-economic indicator of income distribution nor a separate
employment indicator could precisely correspond to the envisaged
system of economic goals. Therefore, the following four indi-
cators are chosen to provide evidence on the progress in equity
and employments
- The increase of the ejido contribution to GDP per ejidatario
in relation to GDP per employee (after direct taxes)
("sectoral equity").
- The increase of the wage share in GDP net of factor incomes
in ejidos and in public services ("functional equity").
- The reduction of "rural underemployment", measured as the
number of the rural employed (except ejidatarios ) multi-
plied by the difference between the minimum wage rate and
the average rural wage rate.
- The reduction of "urban underemployment", measured as the
number of employed in the informal sectors multiplied by
the difference between minimum wage rate and the average
informal wage rate.
Given the minimum wage rate, underemployment can be reduced in
two ways. Either the number of underemployed declines due to
migration between economic sectors, when the unregulated wage
rates do not fall, or unregulated wage rates increase when the
number of underemployed does not grow.- 13
3. Numerical Specification of the Model
In specifying the model empirically 19 70 was chosen as base
year since for this year the most complete set of data is
available. Major sources of information are the census of agri-
12 3
culture and of industries, the population census and the
national account statistics provided by the Banco de Mexico.
The description of the basic relations of the Mexican economy
is based on a new input-output table with 54 sectors which has
been constructed by the ministry of industry for the year 1975.
This matrix is prefered over the 1970 table edited by the
Banco de Mexico since the latter is merely an updated version
of the 1960 matrix in which changes of iritersectoral linkages
were not considered. To incorporate the 1975 matrix into our
model each row was first deflated by the sectoral 1970-1975
price indices and secondly the matrix was aggregated to the
model-classification. The technical coefficients of this aggre-
gated table were then combined with information on sectoral
Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Ejidal - Direccion
General de Estadistica, V Censos Agricola - Ganaderia y
Ejidal, 1970, Resumen General y los tomos de los estados.
Mexico, D.F., 19 75.
2
Secretaria de Industria y Comercio - Direccion General de
Estadistica, IX Censo Industrial 1971; Datos de 1970,
Mexico, D.F., 19 74.
Secretaria de Industria y Comercio - Direccion General de
Estadistica, IX Censo General de Poblacion, 19 70,
Mexico, D.F., 19 72.
Banco de Mexico, Por Cuentas Nacionales y Acervos de ACapital,
Consolidadas por Tipo de Actividad Economica, 1950-1957,
Mexico, D.F., 1969. - Banco de Mexico - Subdireccion de
Investigacion Economica y Bancaria, Estadisticas de la
Oficina de Cuentas de Produccion, 1960-1976, Mexico, D.F.,1977.
Secretaria de Patrimonio y Fomento Industrial - Direccion
General de Politica e Inversiones Industriales, La estructura
de la oferta y la demanda en Mexico, 19 75 - Matrices de
Relaciones Intersectoriales, Mexico 1978.
Banco de Mexico - Subdireccion de Investigacion Economica,
Estimacion del Cuadro Insumo-Producto para 1970 - Utilizando
el Metodo RAS (Version preliminar), Mexico, no date.- 19
gross outputs and other national account data to construct an
input-output table for 1970. The final matrix presented in
Table A3 is a matrix of total transactions including imported
inputs.
Output supply and factor demand in the agricultural sector are
derived from multi-output production functions which are spe-
cified for three farm categories in each of the four agricultural
regions. On the input side, transcendental logarithmic produc-
tion functions are used to estimate substitution elasticities
among the above mentioned agricultural inputs in a cross-section
approach. The respective data are taken from the fifth Mexican
agricultural census. Since separate estimates for farm categories
and regions turned out to be statistically unsatisfactory, re-
gional elasticities of substitution are calculated based on
farm data aggregated to the municipio (district) level. This
implies identical elasticities among farm categories.
The regression results basically confirm a unitary elasticity
among traditional farm inputs and prove that industrial inter-
mediates for agricultural production have also to be treated
2 as a substitutional farm input. For this reason, industrial
intermediates are included as an additional factor of produc-
tion in Cobb-Douglas functions which are used to estimate
production elasticities for the different farm categories
and regions. These elasticities are presented in Table A4.
Concerning output supply, direct transformation elasticities
between the four agricultural product groups had to be esti-
mated on a nation-wide level since more disaggregated time
series of producer's prices and marketed quantities are not
Appropriate trade data are published together with the
input-output table.
2 "'••.
For details see B. Fischer, Faktorsubstitution in Mexikos
Landwirtschaft, Empirische Evidenz und agrarpolitische
Implikationen, Kiel Working Papersf No. 85, February 1979.20 -
available. Respective information on the product level which
1
cover the periods 1950-1975 (agricultural products) and 1960-
2
1976 (animal products) was, however, sufficient to compute
Fisher price and quantity indices for the four model categories.
These data are fitted in a CES-function employing a three stage
estimation procedure to derive the elasticities of transforma-
tion. As expected, the estimated elasticity are relatively high
between "cereals" and ''other agricultural food" (-Oo436) while
it amounts to -0.305 and -0.279 respectively for agricultural
food and agricultural industrial commodities on the one hand
and agricultural products and animal products on the other hand.
It should be stressed that, although these elasticities of
transformation are implemented for all subcategories, quantity
responses to a price change still differ among farm sizes and
regions due to a varying composition of output supply.
The parameters of the linear homogeneous CES-functions which
describe industrial output supply [(6)-(10)] were estimated
separately for the northern and the southern region, based on
information at the municipio --level from the 1970 industrial
census. Within each region the urban differentiation was made
upon the criterion whether a municipio is located either in
the north-eastern (Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo Leon,
San Luis Potosi, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas) or in the central part
(Aguascalientes, D.F., Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico,
Michoacan, Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro, Tlaxcala) of the country
and whether the rcunicipio contains a town with more than 50.000
Nacional Financiera, S.A., Statistics on the Mexican Economy.
Mexico, D.F., 1977.
Banco de Mexico, S.A., Estadisticas de la Oficina de Cuentas
de Produccion, 1960-1976, op. cit.
A detailed description of the methods applied is given in
B. Fischer, Schatzung direkter Transformationselastizitaten
fur die mexikanische Landwirtschaft, March 1976 (mimeo, 8 p.)- 21 -
inhabitants in 1970. Concerning the elasticities of substitution
1 between labour and capital a modified ACMS approach is applied
which related value added per worker to total wages and total
labour input. Census wages were adjusted for a hypothetical
entrepreneurial income and for incomes of family helpers who
2
are included in the published employment figures. Elasticities
of production are computed by the (adjusted) factor shares in
value added, which is justified under the postulated assumption
of constant return to scale. The respective parameters are
shown in Table A5; they confirm a considerable variation of
production characteristics among sectors and regions in Mexico
which was already demonstrated in a more detailed study of
Mexico manufacturing industries.
Private final demand was specified in a "complete" system of
all expenditure and price elasticities which fulfills the
Engel aggregation as well as the homogeneity and symmetry
conditions. Under the separability assumption such a system
can be computed according to the Erisch method once the Engel
elasticities, the budget shares and a special parameter, the
money flexibility are known.
J Based on information from the
latest available (but incomplete) household expenditure survey
For details see M. Bruch,, op.cit., pp. 26sqq. (ACMS is
used as an abbreviation for Arrow, Chenery, Minnas and Solow)
2
For details see U. Hiexrtenz, Zur Schatzung von Produktions-
funktionsparametern fur die Verarbeitende Industrie Mexikos,
December 1978 (mimeo, 7 p.).
See H, Bruch, ibid.
4
R. Frisch, A Complete Scheme for Computing All Direct and
Cross Price Elasticities of Demand from Budgetary Data.
Econometrica, 27 (1959), pp. 177sqq.
A discussion of this approach for countries where no or
incomplete price statistics are available see H. Reiseh,
Ein komplettes IjachfrageSystem des Nahrurigsmittelverbrauchs
fur Indien, Kenia, Malaysia uncT Mexiko. Kiel Working Papers,
No. 75, August 1978.22 -
for 1970 in a first step Engel elasticities ware estimated
employing cross-section regressions over the Mexican states.
For this purpose data were fitted in five functional forms,
which are commonly applied in demand analysis, and the parameter
of the best functional specification was chosen. The respective
elasticity for cereals (1) was calculated as residual from the
Engel aggregation.
The survey provides data in a product disaggregation which
could be brought in line with the model structure. With respect
to regions, however, only a general rural-urban differentiation
was feasible to account for structural differences in consumer
2
behaviour. In a second step the value of money flexibility
was determined by a method suggested by Lluch, Powell and
Williams , so that with Frisch's formula all own and cross
price elasticities for the non-food items could be computed.
Since for foodstuff [(1)-(3), (6)] the separability assumption
seemed to be too restrictive cross price elasticities between
these products are assumed to be zero. In these cases the homo-
geneity condition is observed by adjusting the corresponding
own price elasticities. The final system of all Engel and
Cournot elasticities for the urban and the rural region is
shown in Tables A6 and A7.
Finally, the initial (1970) distribution of factor inputs and
value added between sectors of production and regions had to be
determined. For this purpose information was drawn from the
already cited census and national account statistics as well as
Secretaria de Industria y de Comercio - Direccion General
de Estadistica, Ingresos y Egresos de las Familias en la
Republica Mexicana 1959-70. Tomo III-V, Mexico, D.F., 1971.
2
For further details on quality and scope of data as well as
on the method applied see B. Fischer/U. Hiemenz, Schatzung
eines "kompletten" Systems der privaten Konsumgiiternachfrage
fur Mexiko, February 1979 (mimeo, 13 p.).
C. Lluch, A. Powell, R.A, Williams, Patterns in Household
Demand and Saving, A World Bank Research Publication.
Washington, D.C., 1977.23 -
from a World Bank country report on Mexico.
Since the different census provide strongly contradictory
evidence with respect to employment and since census outputs
do not match national account data, we had to resort to
approximations. Most difficult was, of course, to obtain the
sectoral and regional distribution of capital stock at current
prices required by the model, because there are no.consistent
capital stock data for the Mexican economy since 1967. There-
fore, a total capital stock at current prices was estimated for
1970 based on respective capital stock data of the early
sixties, investment goods price indices (both provided by
national account statistics) and total net investment figures
from the World Bank report. This total stock is distributed
among sectors and regions in accordance with the pattern
emerging from the census. The public capital stock (12) was
derived from public investment in 1970 assuming the observed
ratio between investment and capital stock of the sixties
persisted. The respective value for private services (11)
can then be computed as residual.
Sectoral employment is given by the Population Census,- the
respective regional allocation and the allocation between farm
sizes followed again the pattern shown by the agricultural and
industrial census. Regional service sector and public employ-
ment, however, is directly calculated from the Population
Census making some adjustments concerning the rural-urban
differentiation. In a similar fashion, we computed the regional;
value added for each model category. National account statistics
supplied the basic data.
IBRD, The Economy of Mexico - A Basic Report (In Six
Volumes), Vol. V; Statistical Appendix, Washington, D.C.,
1973.24
As a yardstick for the existence of urban informal employ-
ment in manufacturing industries we used productivity differ-
ences between census data on the one hand and our estimated
output and employment figures on the other hand. Such differ-
ences are prominent in traditional consumer goods (7) and
investment goods industries (10). In these cases, employment
and output (as shown in the Industry Census) as well as the
respective capital stock are classified as the formal sector.
Informal urban employment in private services (11) stems from
income statistics contained in the Population Census. All per-
sons in this sector obtaining an income clearly below the offi-
cial minimum wage are considered to be informally employed.
4. Agricultural Policy
The Mexican agricultural policy, in a much simplified manner,
may be said to pursue two distinct, and possibly conflicting,
lines. The first line would be to maximize the agricultural
"contribution" to the general growth and industrialization
strategy in the way of
- providing agricultural intermediates at low prices to
manufacturing industries thus allowing for high net
producers prices in the branches affected (food processing.,
traditional consumption goods, chemical industries)
- providing unprocessed food at lav/ prices to private consumers
thus keeping down the cost of living index of the working
population and attenuating the pressure for minimum wage
increases which would impair industrial employment
- nevertheless raising agricultural exports to allow for
imports of non-competitive raw materials and investment
goods.25 -
The conflict between low prices for domestic consumers and
high export targets is resolved not by consumption subsidies
but by direct interventions on the input side, i.e. by pro-
viding irrigation, modern inputs and technological innovations
at reduced costs to the producer (
:|agricultural development
policy"). The exception to the first line would be a high price
policy for cereals intended to (a) reach self-sufficiency in
food and (b) provide- a stimulus for farmers to adopt new techno-
logies in cereals production ('Green Revolution') more quickly.
The second line of policy would be to keep political stability
among the rural masses in the way of redistributing land from
large private holdings to ejidos as well as to settle small
farmers on redistributed or newly opened land.
A policy of land reform and settlement can always be resolved
with a growth policy by referring to the unknown welfare losses
resulting from decisions made under conditions of political
instability. Nevertheless, it is of interest to know if,
abstracting from the problem of political stability, the
redistribution of land affects agricultural value added, social
product and industrialization negatively or positively.
Tables 2-4 report the comparative-static solutions for the
welfare indicators per unit of price or quantity intervention
into agricultural product and input markets and into the
allocation of land between ejidos and private large and small
holdings. The solutions for strategic variables in the causal
chain between intervention and welfare-effects are reported
in the extension of the tables and in the Appendix Table A1 .26 -
4.1 Agricultural Product Markets
In the framework of the standard static tv/o sector model of
the open economy reducing the domestic output price ratio
between agricultural and industrial goods will increase the
industrial share in social product, labour force and capital
stock. Despite of the instrumental distortion, industrialization
will increase the social product on account of (a) a labour
market distortion causing a gap between social marginal products
and (b) different sectoral capital intensities causing a reduc-
tion in the income share of the factor with a low marginal
savings propensity. These effects are not assured when the
existence of urban unemployment or informal employment and of
non-traded goods are taken into account. The undetermined social
product effect has been repeatedly shown in the literature
following Harris-Todaros increasing the urban formal employment
opportunities will increase unemployment and underemployment
via an overprooortiona1 rural-urban migration and may well
erode the social product gain of industrialization. The change
in the domestic price ratio of traded goods will, in the case
of a positive effect on the trade balance, a constant capital
inflow and a flexible nominal exchange rate lead to a currency
appreciation thus relatively increasing the price of non-traded
goods. Even in the case of a fixed nominal exchange rate, which
is not considered here, the inflationary pressure would lead
to a relative price increase for non-tradables. The domestic
price ratio between tradables and non-tradables has the char-
acter of a real exchange rate. The industrial share, then, is
only assured to grow relative to the agricultural share but not
necessarily in absolute terms.
See M. Bruno, The Two-Sector Open Economy and the Real
Exchange Rate. The American Economic Review, Vol. 66 (1976),
pp. 566-577.27
The product policy may intervene in foreign trade or in
domestic production (Table 2).. We consider the respective
interventions for non-cereals. With regard to cereals, we only
consider a change in the guaranteed price as cereals are not
exported and import licences are adjusted to allow product
market equilibrium at the fixed price.
Policy interventions into the import and the export of non-
cereals must be considered separately as imported and dom-
estically produced goods in each of the three product groups
(other food-crops? raw materials and animal products) are
regarded as imperfect substitutes. While an export subsidy,
tax reduction or an easing of a quantitative restraint will
directly increase the domestic producer's price, an import
tariff or quantity restriction will not. The import inter-
vention will only raise the domestic consumption price according
to the import share in the composite consumption good. Pro-
ducer's net price ratios and, thus, factor allocation will
only be affected via the intermediate use of the protected
good and via a change in the relative price of non-traded
goods.
An export intervention, therefore, will have more dramatic
as well as other effects than an import intervention. The
distinction between an import and an export intervention
vanishes in the case of cereals where imported and domestically
produced goods are regarded as homogeneous. We take up import
intervention - a one percent increase in the import price of
all non-cereals by an appropriate quantity restriction - first,
then turn to export intervention - one percent increase in the
exporter's price by a reduction in the export tax of one abso-
lute percentage point -, go on to a one percent increase in the
guaranteed price for cereals and finally consider a production
intervention - a one percent production subsidy for non-cereals.Table 2 - Comparative-Static Model Solutions: Agricultural Trade and Production Policies
Policy
(T) Increasing the protection against
non-cereal agricultural imports
(2) Reducing the tax on non-cereal
agricultural exports
(3) Increasing the guaranteed prices
for cereals





















































































































































































Among non-cereals other food crops are the only product group
to have a high import share in domestic consumption. The
immediate effects of a rising import price, then, are a sub-
stitution of domestically produced for imported food crops
in consumption and a depression of net prices in food pro-
cessing. Both effects result in a sharp decline of (unpro-
cessed and processed) food exports requiring a currency deval-
uation in order to maintain the balance of payments equili-
brium. The rise in all traded goods prices compensates for
the negative net price effect in all trading sectors using
non-cereals as intermediates. Non-traded good producers, how-
ever, experience a negative net price as both the own price
declines and the prices of agricultural and industrial inter-
mediates go up. Labour demand in food processing and in serv-
ices is reduced and not fully compensated for by the increasing
demand of other manufacturing sectors. In consequence, total
formal sector employment is affected negatively and the labour
set free is absorbed by the agricultural and the informal
sectors at falling wage rates.
The different welfare effects follow easily. An increase in
agricultural employment - given a widening gap between the
rural wage rate and the constant formal minimum wage rate -
lesds to a welfare loss in terms of social product foregone.
Increasing the prices of traded goods, however, will increase
the GDP share of both agriculture and manufacturing, thus
aiding industrialization. The employment effects are negative,
since both rural and urban informal employment grow and wage
rates fall. The effect on functional equity is positive, with
labour's share in total factor income increasing due to the
reallocation of labour to the labour-intensive agricultural
and informal sectors. Regional equity effects are negative
since without an inflow of capital into agriculture increasing
rural emplovment reduces the relative ner capita income in- 30 -
both rural regions. Finally, institutional regulations shelter
ejidos against inmigration of labour. Per capita income on
ejidos, therefore, is not affected in absolute terms but rises
relative to the overall per capita income.
Non-cereal Exports
The reduction of export taxes, by raising net prices to agri-
cultural producers, pushes up the labour demand of agricul-
tural sectors and increases rural wage rates. By raising the
domestic consumption prices it lowers the net prices of indus-
trial producers, particularly in food processing and to a
smaller extent in traditional consumer goods and chemicals.
The dramatic increase in agricultural exports is not fully
compensated for by reductions in manufactured exports; The
slight revaluation adds to the negative net price effects in
manufacturing industries and attenuates the effects in agri-
culture and services.
With diminishing labour demand at constant minimum wages in
the urban regions and increasing labour demand in the agri-
cultural sectors at increasing wage rates, labour is flowing
back to the rural regions. With formal employment opportu-
nities worsening and rural wages increasing, urban informal
employment looses attraction as well. Finally, urban-to-rural
migration and the allocation af labour from manufacturing to
agricultural sectors reduces private as well as intermediate
consumption demand for local goods in urban regions while
increasing it in rural areas. A falling services price in
urban areas further reduces urban employment. On the other
hand, it prevents a movement of manufacturing industries
into rural locations. In combination with a rising rural and
a constant urban minimum wage rate, manufacturing industries
even move into the urban regions, thus increasing the regional
specialization as a result of increasing agricultural prices.31 -
Following this interpretation of the changes in certain
strategic .variables, the welfare effects of agricultural
export subsidies can be understood. The reallocation of
labour from high- to low-productivity sectors, i.e. from
manufacturing industries to agricultural sectors, reduces
total GDP as-well as the industrial share in GDP. Further-
more, as agricultural sectors are more labour-intensive, the
labour share in national income is increasing thus reducing
the availability of capital and adding to the reduction of
GDP. With ejido-membership fixed institutionally, the price
increase directly carries over to per capita income of ejida-
tarios. The marked increase in rural wage rates suffices to
reduce rural underemployment despite an inflow of migrants
into the rural-north and the rural-south. The main employ-
ment effect, however, occurs in the urban regions where the
outmigration of the informally employed markedly reduces under-
employment. The effect on regional equity is negative for the
rural-south as the locational specialization of manufacturing
industries deprives it of the most capital-intensive sectors.
In the rural-north, agriculture is both more land- and capital-
intensive. Here, specialization will not fully erode the re-
gional gains resulting from higher agricultural product prices,
Cereals
An increase in the guaranteed price of cereals affects pro-
ducers as well as consumers. Intuitively, therefore, one v/ould
expect v/elfare effects similar to those of a reduction of
export taxes for non-cereals. The results shown in Table 1,
however, are strikingly different. Structural differences
on the supply and on the demand side of the product markets
provide the explanation. Ejidos account for 55 % of total
value product in cereals against 35 % in non-^cereals. Since- 32
ejidos can only apply additional industrial inputs but not
more labour,, the price hike leads only to a modest increase
in total volume of agricultural production as well as in
total agricultural labour demand. On the demand side, the
absolute ownprice elasticities of private consumption demand
are extremely different (see Tables A6 and A7). Unlike non-
cereals, the cereals price change has only negligeable effects
on the volume of private consumption. The reduction in cereal
imports, then, is not sufficient to compensate for reduced
exports of processed food, the balance of payments equilib-
rium requires a depreciation. With traded goods prices rising
the negative impact of rising agricultural prices on manu-
facturing is compensated and the negative impact on social
product is much reduced. Labour set free in the urban services
sectors finds rural employment at reduced wage rates only
thus increasing rural underemployment. The main trade-off,
then, of a cereals price policy is between the per capita
income on ejidos and the factor income of the rural labour
force outside the ejidos-
Production
Combining the reduction of export taxes and consumption
taxes for domestically produced goods amounts to a produc-
tion subsidy for domestic producers. Unlike the pure export
intervention, the production subsidy neither causes a re-
structuring in manufacturing at the expense of the labour-
intensive food processing sector nor a substitution between
imported and domestically produced non-cereals. The addi-
tional agricultural production, however, promotes agricul-
tural exports without impairing food processing exports, thus
requiring a more pronounced revaluation which harms all
trading sectors alike but assists services. Total labour
demand, then, is increasing more markedly and raises rural
as well as informal wage rates more strongly than in the
case of export subsidies. With rural demand for services33 -
increasing due to rural inmigration and expansion of agri-
cultural production, the rural-north witnesses a distinct
rise in services prices. In the rural-south the effect is
compensated for by the outmigration of manufacturing indus-
tries in reaction to the rising rural-to-urban formal v/age
ratio.
A Comparison of Product Market Policies
A comparison of agricultural trade and production policies
under the perspective of contributions to income growth and
industrialization manifests a striking difference. In the
cases of export and of production intervention the main line
of argumentation used in the standard two sector models also
holds in the complex quantitative model. Lowering agricultural
prices aides in industrialization, reduces the labour share
and increases total income. Furthermore, the results show
that society not only has to pay a price in terms of functional
equity, but also rural and particularly urban underemploy-
ment increase, and the per capita income of ejidatarios de-
clines sharply. The only positive effect is in the regional
equity of the rural-south as this region attracts manufacturing
industries due to falling v/age rates.
The effects of lowering prices on the import side or by re-
ducing the guaranteed price level of cereals are more complex
as the balance of payments effect turns in favour of non-
traded goods. The expansion of services fully erodes the
industrialization effect and leaves only a small gain in
social product. The two cases show that these unexpected
effects can occur for different reasons. In the case of re-
ducing domestic prices by import interventions the domestic
producers turn to the export market, in the case of reducing
the cereals price an inelastic factor demand of the main
supplier as well as an inelastic private consumption demand
restrain the import reaction.- 34 -
4.2 Agricultural Input Markets
The sectoral development aspect of agricultural policy is
manifested on the input side (Table 3). The supply of irri-
gation services, of modern inputs, and of research and exten-
sion services to develop and to speed up the diffusion of new
technologies are the most notable fields of government and,
partly, foreign donors activities. Since irrigation services,
for reasons noted earlier, have been distributed unevenly
between, ejidosj, small and large private farms, we consider
separately the effects of a one percent increase in the public
irrigation investment for each type of holding. Public irri-
gation investments directly reduce public additions to the
general capital stock available to manufacturing and services
sectors. Data limitations do not allow the separate modelling
of the various policies designed to promote the use of modern
inputs in agricultural production. These policies - ranging
from public investments into distribution channels to input
specific credit program's - have the common property of lowering
the input price to the agricultural producer. We, therefore,
consider the effects of a hypothetical one percent consumption
subsidy on the composite good "industrial intermediates for
agriculture". The effects of research and extension services
are even more difficult to model as information on the rela-
tion between additional agricultural production due to techno-
logical progress and the costs of generating and disseminating
progress is not available. We make use here of a guesstimate
that costs amount to about one-third of the agricultural pro-
duction increase. We consider the effects of a one percent
increase in tetal agricultural productivity accomplished by
additional public services financed out of a consumption tax
on non-cereals.
T. Arndt, D. Darymple, V. Ruttan (eds.), Resource Allocation
and Productivity, Minneapolis, 1977.Table 3 - Comparative-Static Model Solutions: Agricultural Development Policies
Policy
Increasing irrigation investments on
(5) ejidoe
(6) small private farms
(7) large private farms
(8) Shifting irrigation investments
from large private farms to
ejidoa
(9) Increasing the consumption sub-
sidy for industrial intermediates
in agricultural production

































































































































































































































































































With capital and land inputs determined exogenously, the
causal chain of events is basically the same for the various
input policies; agricultural production increases, the currency
revalues, agricultural production increases, the currency re-
values, agricultural labour demand outside ejidos as well as
rural services factor demand increase, manufacturing labour
demand decreases although manufacturing need not decrease de-
pending on the reaction of public savings to the specific policy.
Labour migrates to rural regions where wages may or may not
increase according to the relative strength of demand and supply
effects. The differences in the welfare effects of various in-
put policies, then, result from different intensities of the
conflicting effects. The common negative effect on the GDP
share of total manufactures needs to comment as the increasing
agricultural share and the currency revaluation work in the
same direction.
Irrigation
Consecutive Mexican governments have been investing heavily
into irrigation programs. In 1970, roughly one third of the
cropland is irrigated. The model results showing a negative
social product effect for additional irrigation investments
in ejidos, small and large farms alike should, therefore, not
come as a surprise. The marginal productivity of investments
has been declining as it became increasingly difficult to find
new areas suitable for irrigation projects. Irrigation invest-
ments for ejidos will definitely increase per capita income on
northern and southern ejidos, but will also increase rural
underemployment because the reduction in manufacturing labour
demand is not met by additional agricultural labour demand.
This also prevents an increase in the labour share. The regional
equity effect is positive on account of increasing agricultural
per capita income. Irrigation investments on small and large
private farms do increase agricultural labour demand thus
avoiding a deterioration of rural wages and leading to more37
positive effects in employment and in functional equity.
Comparing the investment effects for different types of
holdings, the solutions show that not much can be gained by
shifting irrigation investments from large private holdings
to ejidos. The social product effect would be almost nil.
There would be a welfare gain in terms of ejido per capita
income and regional equity but this would be obtained at a
welfare loss in terms of both rural and urban underemploy-
ment as well as functional equity.
Industrial Inputs and Innovations
The use of industrial inputs in agricultural production is
sensitive to changes in the own-price of inputs and in total
factor productivity. This is shown by the respective model
solutions for the quantity of inputs applied in the agri-
cultural sector per unit of price subsidy (<=* 1.4) and per
unit of productivity increase (=* 2.1). The solutions are
congruent with the empirical observation of a marked increase
in the sectoral gross production share of industrial inputs
in the late 1960s when the sector was successfully adopting
the new technologies.
Although industrial inputs are a substitutable factor in
agricultural production, the factor price subsidy increases
labour demand on private farms due to an overwhelming output
effect. With only a negligeable effect on formal employment,
increasing rural wages attract the urban underemployed into
agricultural and rural services employment. The attraction
is even stronger in the case of an increase in total factor
productivity, because the output effect on labour demand is
not weakened by a factor substitution effect. Both input
subsidy and the promotion of agricultural productivity, then,
are the only interventions so far considered combining positive
employment effects in rural and urban regions with a gain
in social product.- 38 -
The positive effects of both measures on sectoral and func-
tional equity need no comment. The positive regional equity
effect arising from increasing income in agricultural and
rural services sectors is, again, compensated by the out-
migration of manufacturing industries from the rural-south
due to the relatively increasing rural wage-rental ratio.
4.3 Land Reform and Settlement
The ongoing redistribution of land to ejidos and private small
holdings is usually given a considerable amount of credit in
maintaining the political stability in the face of social
strains caused by rapid industrialization and rapid population
growth. The contribution of the land reform to agricultural
production and to social product, however, is disputed.
T. Schultz , for example, briskly statess "... they (the
ejidos) have not done well. But many farms outside the ejidos
have done exceedingly well." F. Dovring , on the other hand,
claims that ejidos as well as private small farms combine
factors more in accordance with the scarcity relations of the
country than land and capital-intensive private large farms do.
Dovring also attributes positive employment and equity effects
to the ejido-system. Both views need not be conflicting as a
poor performance in agricultural production may under distortions
be compensated by other effects to allow for positive social
product, employment and equity effects.
1
T. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture,
Wew Haven and London. 1964, p. 20.
z F. Dovring, Land Reform in Mexico. AID Spring Review of
Land Reform, 1970, 2nd. ed., Vol. VII, Washington, D.C.,
1970, pp. 35sqq.- 39
We consider the effects of a redistribution of non-irrigated
cultivable land held by private large farms. Solutions are
obtained for three interventions (Table 4); a one percent
increase in ejido land at a constant ejido-rnembership (the
case of "closed ejidos"), a one percent increase in ejido
land at a constant man-land ratio on ejidos (the case of
"new ejidos'') , a one percent increase in land on private
small holdings with no conditions attached to employment on
these holdings (the case of "settlement"). We do not consider
the settlement on newly opened land as no information is
available on the costs of land reclamation. We also consider
a land reform package combining the distribution of land
and irrigation investments to ejidos.
The Case of Closed Ejidos
The redistribution of land to closed ejidos, naturally, raises
the per capita income of ejidatarios. It must reduce the total
agricultural labour force as the labour set free by large farms
cannot enter the ejidos but is absorbed at falling wage rates
in the other rural sectors and, to a small extent, in urban
informal employment. Since ejidal farms use industrial inputs
less intensively than private farms the land redistribution
reduces total agricultural consumption of industrial inputs.
With labour and industrial intermediate inputs reduced total
agricultural value added is affected negatively.
The negative effect on the agricultural contribution to the
social product is compensated by positive effects. The re-
distribution closes the gap between the marginal products of
labour in ejidos and in private farming caused by the communal
ownership. It further increases the labour supply to non-
agricultural sectors where the marginal product of labour
is higher, reflecting private costs of intersectoral migration.Table 4 - Comparative-Static Model Solutions: Land Reform Policies
Policy
Redistributing non-irrigated land
from large private holdings to
(11) closed ejidoa
(12) new ejidoB
(13) small private farms





























































































































































The other welfare effects of a distribution to closed ejidos
follow easily. With labour leaving the agricultural sector,
(a) additional industrial employment raises the industrial
sharef (b) additional employment in less labour-intensive
sectors lowers labour's share in total factor income, (c)
additional employment in rural industrial and services sectors
has positive effects on regional equity for the rural-north
and the rural-south, (d) additional rural employment at falling
wage rates adds to the rural underemployment problem, (e)
additional informal employment adds to the urban underemploy-
ment problem.
The Case of Mew Ejidos
The distribution of land to new ejidos removes labour from
the supply side of the labour market thus increasing the
rural wage rates. Private agricultural employment falls more
markedly than in the case of closed ejidos and so does the
total use of industrial intermediates in agricultural produc-
tion. The gap between marginal products of labour in ejidos
and in private farming widens. Despite an increase in total
agricultural employment the land reform, then, has a negative
effect on total agricultural value added. In the case of new
ejidos the negative effect on social product is augmented by
decreasing nonagricultural employment. The reduction in labour
supply changes the other welfare solutions as wells the reform
reduces rural and urban underemployment and.increases functional
equity but has negative effects on sectoral and regional equity,
while the industrialization effect is negligeable.
The Case of Settlement
Private small farms use more labour and more industrial inter-
mediates per unit of land than either ejidos or private large
farms do- A redistribution of land from private large to
private small farms will, therefore, not only increase the total- 42
agricultural input of labour but also of intermediates. Small
private farms also use resources more efficiently than ejidoss
whereas the average labour productivity is, on the national
average, almost equal on both types of holdings the average
land productivity on small farms is nearly four times as high
as on ejidos. It should not come as a surprise, then, that a
distribution of land to small private instead of ejidal holdings
increases total agricultural value added. With non-cereal ex-
ports increasing and cereal imports decreasing the reform re-
quires a revaluation which in turn increases the factor demand
of services sectors. As both agricultural and services labour
demand increase, the free wage rates go up markedly.
Industrialization is hurt both by decreasing product prices
and by increasing rural wage rates. The negative effect on
social product overcompensates the additional agricultural
contribution thus causing a welfare loss in terms of social
product foregone. The reform has markedly positive effects
both on urban and rural employment and on functional equity.
Regional equity effects, however, are negative as increasing
rural and constant minimum wage rates attract manufacturing
industries into urban locations. Per capita income on ejidos,
finally, is hurt by decreasing prices for non-cereals.
Land Reform Package
Before comparing the results of a land reform in favour of
ejidos with those of a reform in favour of small farms, it
should be noted, that neither the case of new ejidos nor the
case of closed ejidos is doing justice to the actual policy
followed since 1953. The policy includes an element of de-
creasing the man-land ratio by increasing the minimum size of
farms in new ejidos, it also includes irrigation investments
and credit and extension programs. There is, thus, a combina-
tion of land reform and of agricultural development policy.43 •-
In order to isolate the land reform aspect, we consider the
welfare effects of a package combining a land redistribution
to new ejidos with a decreasing man-land ratio and with a
reallocation of irrigation investments from private large
farms to ejidos. The solutions can be derived as the sum of
policies 8,- 11 and 12.
The combined policy expectedly avoids the negative effect on
ejidal per capita income arising in the case of new ejidos.
The negative effect on agricultural value added is strength-
ened by the reallocation of investments, however, the nega-
tive social product effect is marginally attenuated by the
reduced demand for agricultural labour. The trade-offs be-
tween positive employment and functional equity effects and
negative industrialization and regional equity effects charac-
teristic for the case of new ejidos also persist in the combined
policy.
Comparing the solutions for a land reform package and for
settlement the advantages of a policy reversal in favour of
small farms become manifesto Despite a dramatic positive effect
on agricultural value added the social product effect is near
nil as the reversal slows down the industrialization process.
The welfare gains to be achieved by the reversal consist of
a further reduction of rural and urban underemployment and of
increasing functional equity. The additional welfare losses
caused by the reversal consist of negative effects on regional
and sectoral equity.44
5. Manufacturing Industries
As pointed out in the introductory chapter enhanced growth
of industrial production was the prime objective of successive
Mexican Development Plans. In the pursuit of this objective
an industrial promotion policy was set up which primarily
consisted of protection against foreign competitors, with
particular emphasis on import protection for producers of
more sophisticated, highly capital intensive manufacturing
goods, and of subsidizing investment in manufacturing. To
avoid socially and politically undesirable repercussions of
the induced industrial absorption of available capital on
the standard of living of the working class this policy was
backed up by a minimum wage legislation and other interferences
into the labour markets which were to improve non-wage income
of the labour force. Industrial as well as social policies
reinforced rather than leveled the locational disadvantages
of rural areas so that both population and economic activities
became more and more concentrated in the Metropolitan District
of Mexico. This, in turn, induced not only the already dis-
cussed attempts to mitigate the pressure on agriculture but
in recent years also a government programme for rural indus-
trialization. In sum, the whole package of industrialization
policies has distorted the relation of producers net prices
(trade distortion), the relation of relative factor prices
(factor market distortion) and the regional distribution of
economic activities (rural-urban distortion). The impact of
these distortions and of hypothetical policies, which could
balance the distortions, is discussed in this chapter with
respect to the welfare goals of the official Mexican devel-
opment strategy.45 -
5.1 The Trade Distortions
Despite some scattered export promotion measures the Mexican
industrialization strategy was governed by import substitu-
tion policies throughout the sixties and the early seventies.
A comprehensive system of import licensing rather than tariffs
protected all branches of manufacturing industry against foreign
competition. This protection manifests itself in a substantial
difference between domestic and world market prices which intro-
duces a bias of incentives against industrial export production
as well as against ail non-manufacturing activities into the
Mexican economy. Although some protection of manufacturing
industry may - according to trade theory - be justified on
grounds of dynamic gains from industrialization, the Mexican
structure of economic incentives is considered to be distorted
by providing too strong incentives to manufacturing production
for domestic markets, and, within manufacturing, to the pro-
duction of investment goods,, consumer durables and some indus-
trial intermediates (products 0-1O). If this notion is true,
welfare gains could be derived from a general reduction of
import protection to manufacturing and from equalizing effec-
tive rates of protection between industrial activities.
First best solutions for equalizing effective rates would
either be an appropriate adjustment of the nominal implicit
protection or export subsidies to the discriminated activities
while production subsidies are considered as a second best
2
solution because of the inherent budgetary repercussions.
See L. Miiller-Ohlsen, op.cit. , pp. 17sqq. - B. Balassa,
op.cit., pp. 33sqq.
2
This evaluation is following B. Balassa, op.cit., pp.18-19.
Production subsidies are also considered second best because
they cause domestic rates of transformation to diverge from
domestic rates of substitution. See J.N. Bhagwati, The
Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare. Ins
J.£NL Bhagwati, R.W. Jones, R.A. Mundell, J. Vanek- (eds.),
Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth,, Amsterdam, London,
Hew York, 1971, pp. 69-90.46
The validity of these suggestions for the Mexican economy
is demonstrated in Table 5. Solutions for strategic variables
are also reported in Table A2.
Production
The economic logic of industrial import protection rests on
two arguments s the existence of a distortion in factor markets
which discriminates against manufacturing, e.g. through mini-
mum wages, and the realization of technological externalities
(learning by doing and innovations) assuming that the rate of
progress can be higher in manufacturing than elsewhere. Under
these conditions industrial protection is supposed to increase
the productivity of the economy because factors of production
are withdrawn primarily from agriculture and allocated in
more productive industrial activities. This favourable result
is brought about by expanding demand for domestically produced
goods and by an increase of domestic producers prices which
happens if imported and domestic goods are sufficiently homo-
geneous (as assumed in our model). Conversely, producers prices
of non-protected goods decrease as a result of the appreciation
of the currency, which is required to maintain the trade balance,
and as a result of higher prices for industrial inputs. There-
fore, output of non-protected activities will contract while
the protected domestic production can employ more resources
and expands.
Our. estimates for the Mexican economy, however, only partly
confirm the above theoretical notion. In the case of each
individual branch of the manufacturing industry, higher pro-
tection (i.e. a 1 p.c. increase of import prices) in fact
leads to an increased share of total manufacturing in gross
domestic output and reduces the respective share of agriculture.
The underlying mechanism proves to be basically as described
above. GDP, however, is either negatively or not at all af-
fected, showing that highly industrial import protection isTable 5 - ComparatiTe-Statio Model Solutionsi Industrial Product Market Policies
Policy
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counterproductive for the Mexican economy despite the factor
market distortion. The major reason for this unexpected finding
stems from the existence of a large local service sector which
is also discriminated by industrial protection. The withdrawl
of resources from services and the subsequent decline of out-
put primarily causes the GDP losses, given the more than 60 p.c.
share of this sector in total output. This means that in eco-
nomies like the Mexican one, which are characterized by a re-
latively small agricultural and a relatively large service
sector, factor market distortions cannot serve as a rationale
for protection of manufacturing industries. Factors of pro-
duction are merely reallocated between economic activities
which are subject to similar factor market distortions.
It follows, that any reduction in industrial protection will
improve the allocative efficiency in the Mexican economy, if
dynamic effects from differential rates of technical progress
between sectors can be neglected. Since our model does not
provide comparative dynamic solutions we have made some rough
estimates assuming a yearly productivity increase in manu-
facturing and services of 3 p.c. and 1 p.c. respectively.
In the framework of our model a 1 p.c. shift between the
shares of manufacturing and services would then -. ceteris
paribus - result in 3 p.c. GDP growth per annum. Our esti-
mates concerning the impact of protection imply a shift of
.0441 p.c. between services and manufacturing which means
that the substantial productivity differentials have to be
maintained for approximately 6 years just to balance the costs
of industrial protection.
This example demonstrates - at least for the Mexican economy -
the weakness of the arguments on which the case for industrial
protection is built. Therefore, net income gains seem to be a
rather likely outcome of lower trade barriers. Those gains
will particularly be derived from reduced rates of implicit
nominal protection to industries 8-10 which indicates that50
differences of nominal protection reflect similar differences
in effective protection among industries. Less nominal pro-
tection to industries 3-10 is obviously a step towards equal-
izing effective protection which improves industrial resource
allocation. The effects, however, remain rather limited in
size, primarily because domestically produced and imported
goods are not entirely homogeneous and domestic producers
prices do not fully adjust to increased import prices.
A much more powerful policy measure in this respect is an
export subsidy which directly raises domestic net producers
prices in the promoted activities. Concerning growth of GDP
the positive signs attributed to export subsidies for food
processing (6) and traditional consumer goods (7) as well as
the negative impact of such subsidies for the already highly
protected branches (8-9) confirm expectations in the sense
that the present protective system indeed discriminates against
industries 6-7 also in effective terms and that an alleviation
of this distortion results in higher output growth. The varying
results for the inuustrialization variable, however, require
explanation.
Concerning food processing, the subsidy stimulates output and
exports thus giving rise to a revaluation of the Mexican
currency in order to maintain the foreign trade balance. This
exchange rate adjustment has to be sizeable because total
exports increase significantly although the appreciation
negatively effects prices of all other traded commodities
reducing their net producers prices and outputs as well as
exports. The expansion of total exports reflects the relatively
large export share which food processing had already achieved
in the past. Since this particular sector has strong back-
ward linkages with agriculture and services, domestic demand
for these activities also increases. While this effect is not
felt in agriculture, because it is more than offset by the
exchange rate induced price decrease, the production of private- 51 -
services, heavily expands both in rural and in urban areas
since the price of the local good is increased in real terms
in response to the decline in prices of tradables. This con-
tributes to GDP growth and explains, together with the reduc-
tion of output in all industrial activities besides food
processing, the declining degree of industrialization.
The opposite results were observed in the case of an export
subsidy for investment goods industries, which also leads to
a drastic increase of total exports. However, given the high
import share in this sector, imports also rise since domes-
tically produced investment goods become more expensive, so
that the necessary revaluation remains moderate. Thus, net
prices of the other industrial activities are only slightly
lowered and total industrial value added still expands. This
policy measure nevertheless implies economic costs in terms
of GDP losses, because the allocation of additional resources
in manufacturing (primarily in sector 10) causes a reduction
in output and value added in both agriculture and services,
which outweighs the industrial contribution to GDP growth.
Concerning industrial intermediates, similar reactions take
place. Although total exports decreased in this case, a re-
valuation of the currency is still required since total imports
are lowered by a larger amount in response to slackening do-
mestic demand. The exchange rate adjustment is a little bit
larger than in the case of investment goods and, more impor-
tantly, the net producers price of investment goods sharply
declines due to higher input costs for ^industrial intermediates.
For both reasons, total industrial value added is shrinking
and the inefficiency of the policy measure in terms of fore-
gone GDP becomes more obvious.
In fact, export subsidies turn out to promote both income
growth and industrialization only when applied to traditional
consumer goods. The promotion of this labour-intensive activity
only slightly discriminates against other manufacturing52
industries. An expansion of output in this sector means -
above all - shifting capital from a (at the margin) less pro-
ductive to a highly productive occupation, so that total indus-
trial value added is not prevented from rising. In urban areas
additional demand for services becomes effective which increases
prices and output of the local sector. Both effects more than
offset the declining agricultural contribution to GDP. This
outcome is clearly in line with the notion of comparative
advantage? To lower discrimination against those industries
which intensively make use of domestic factors of production
is beneficial in terms of net income gains for the whole
economy.
Summarizing, it is interesting to note that a simultaneous
export promotion of the hitherto discriminated branches of
manufacturing industry (food processing and traditional con-
sumer goods) lead to a more effective exploitation of available
resources but is detrimental to structural change in the economy,
since more resources will be employed in non-industrial activi-
ties. A further support of the already highly protected branches
8-10, on the other hand, favours industrial expansion at the
expense of all other activities. Both findings clearly corre-
spond to the impact of import protection discussed earlier,
but the structural implications are different. While import '
protection induces a shift of resources between services and
manufacturing, export subsidies are withdrawing factors cf
production from agriculture as predicted in the usual two
sector models.
In evaluating these solutions, two qualifications have to
be kept in mind. First,, ,_in a dynamic framework income gains
or losses may easily be outweighed by opposite influences due
to differentials of productivity growth among sectors.
This applies in particular to an export subsidy for food
processing which benefits the production of services. A change
in the signs of the income variable is, however, less likely- 53
in all other cases since factors of production are primarily
reallocated between agricultural and industrial sectors which
reveal similar rates of productivity increase. Secondly, one
should consider that the solutions were derived for rather
highly aggregated subdivisions of manufacturing industry. The
product classification conceals that particularly within in-
vestment goods industries there are quite a number of activi-
ties which have already achieved international competitiveness.
It is likely that these activities also suffer from the pre-
vailing protective system through high input costs and there-
fore should be granted an export subsidy to alleviate this
distortion. The subsidy would then induce ;a shift from import-
competing to export-oriented production within the industry
thus im£>roving resource allocation despite prevailing import
protection. This process of intra-industrial restructuring
can, of course, not be described in our model. But the net
effect derived in our model for an export subsidy to all manu-
facturing industries, which shows positive signs for industrial
and income growth likewise, would presumably be even stronger,
if account could be taken of intra-industrial trade discrimina-
tion.
Exactly the opposite, namely negative results were obtained
for a production subsidy to all branches of manufacturing
industry (13) which turns out to be a redistribution from the
public budget to the factors of production at the expense of
GDP.
Production and export subsidies influence the economy basically
in the same directions but the production subsidy has a much
stronger impact for two reasons. First, since the production
subsidy in itself does not alter domestic eonsumer prices,
the necessary revaluation of the currency and the respective
price decrease of tradables are more pronounced. And secondly,,
the financial burden on the public budget is larger than in
the case of export subsidies. The latter reason explains the
controversal effect of both measures on GDP at market prices- 54
and the first is responsible for the declining industrial
share. However? a production subsidy also serves its purpose
in correcting for the foreign trade distortion when granted
to the sectors food processing and traditional consumer goods
which are hardly protected. The effects on total output and
industrial share resemble those of respective export subsidies
but are much smaller in size, which is again explained by the
different impact of both measures on the local sector and by
the negative budgetary repercussions of a production subsidy.
This supports the suggestion that production subsidies are
only second best policy measures in the context of a develop-
ing country.
In comparing the various model solutions, it might be safe
to conclude that, given the existing foreign trade distortions,
an industrial export promotion policy based on export subsidies
would be the most powerful policy both with respect to a fast
growth of total income as well as to a restructuring of the
Mexican economy towards manufacturing industry. Such a policy
could further be supported by a reduction of import protec-
tion for the highly protected activities, while a continua-
tion of the prevailing import substitution policy will induce
income losses.
Employment
In Mexican development plans the employment of the labour force
is emphasized (almost) as much as output growth. In the light
of more than 3 p.c. population growth per annum and a skewed
age pyramid - more than 50 p.c. of total population is below
20 years of age - this economic goal deserves special attention
indeed. Like those in most developing countries Mexican labour
markets are fragmented into rural and urban informal employ-
ment with unrestricted wage flexibility and in formal urban
employment, which is governed by an administered wage rate
fixed above the equilibrium wage (see introductory chapter).55 -
Given this labour market distortion, the employment problem
presents itself as a problem of underemployment rather than
of open unemployment. Underemployment accrues either from
lov/ly paid, rural occupations particularly in agriculture and
rural services or from self-employment and casual jobs in the
urban informal sector. Therefore, underemployment has two
dimensions^ the number of underemployed people and the wage
rates outside the formal sector. Both aspects are combined
in our indicator for rural and urban underemployment.
The current theoretical assumption about the relation between
output growth and employment is that labour market distortions
might lead to a dichotomy between the two goals. More formal
employment does not necessarily mean less underemployment
when additional formal employment increases the likelihood
of getting a formal.occupation thus inducing rural-urban
migration into the informal sector. The consequence might
merely be a shift from rural to urban underemployment, the
welfare implications of which are undetermined. Furthermore,
traditional theory is built on a two sector model. Services,
however, play a very important role in the Mexican economy
as shown earlier. Therefore, the impact of more industrial
employment on underemployment will depend on the corresponding
development of agriculture and services likewise. If industrial
promotion policies simultaneously discriminate against other
economic activities, more industrial employment could very
well be achieved at the expense of more underemployment.
How such an undesirable result can be brought about, is
demonstrated by import protection for manufactured products,
which shifts internal price relations to the disadvantage of
non-industrial activities. Declining agricultural and urban
service factor demand have a twofold effect on labour markets
which almost outweigh each other with respect to the ratio
of expected wages. On the one hand, total formal employment
decreases, thus slowing down rural-urban migration because56 --
the chances to enter into the formal sector are diminished.
On the other hand, rural wage rates also have to fall, which
in principle accelerates outmigration from rural areas. The
net effect is a minor increase in the rural labour force which
does not prevent informal urban employment from rising. This
also drives informal wages down. In sum, both rural and in-
formal employment increases and the respective wages decline
so that there is more underemployment in the economy.
Since the described mechanism also works in the opposite
directions a more liberal trade policy, which reduces import
barriers, not only proves to be a first best solution with
respect to income growth but also has positive effects on
employment promotion. All other policy measures, which could
be introduced to alleviate the trade distortions, are rather
characterized by a dichotomy between output and employment
goals. Export subsidies which strongly enhance output growth
and promote industrialization merely induce a shift from rural
to urban underemployment.
With the exception of food processing industrial activities
are heavily concentrated in urban areas. Increasing industrial
output and, in some cases, the ensuing expansion of urban
services create significant amounts of new jobs in the formal
sector of the economy inducing a voluminous rural-urban migra-
tion. Although this migration reduces the rural labour supply,
rural wage rates still go down because agricultural labour
demand is shrinking on account of the currency appreciation.
Nevertheless, outmigration is sufficiently large to ease the
problem of rural underemployment. The opposite mechanism works
in urban areas. Additional formal employment and higher in-
formal wage rates, which accrue from the policy, induced pro-
ducer price increases in manufacturing and urban services, tend
to diminish underemployment„ This effect, hov/ever, is spoiled
by the large numbers of urban in-migrants.
Almost exactly the opposite reactions are initiated by an
export subsidy to processed food, which favours GDP growth57 -
but cuts down industrialization and, thereby, c^lso total formal
employment,, This latter effect is particularly marked in the
urban south where manufacturing industries are concentrated.
Since food processing is regionally more equally distributed
than other manufacturing activities, industrial and - via
linkages - services' demand for labour increases in rural
areas while agricultural demand decreases. The final balance
of these opposing influences differs between the two rural
areas. In the rural north additional employment in food
processing and services suffices to occupy a larger rural
labour force at a higher average wage rate. In the rural
south which suffers from sizeable remigration from the cities,,
the increased labour force can only be employed at a reduced
average wage rate. Thus, total rural underemployment slightly
increases while urban underemployment considerably declines
because - given the reduction of formal employment ~ less
people are prepared to accept voluntary underemployment as
an 'entrance fee" to the formal sector.
The service sector also plays a crucial role in explaining
the employment effects of a production subsidy to manufacturing
since primarily urban services are indirectly favoured by this
policy. The ensuing enlargement of formal employment again
induces rural-urban migration as in the case of export sub-
sidies. The number of people attracted to the cities more
than outweighs the increase of the informal wage rate in the
urban north so that total urban underemployment is growing
larger. Conversely, the rural labour force is shrinking to an
extent that rural wages go up despite the inherent discrimina-
tion against agriculture and rural manufacturing. Therefore,
production subsidies either to total manufacturing or to single
branches issue a very favourable impact on rural underemploy-
ment .
The lesson to draw from this analysis is that none of the
discussed trade and production policies will simultaneously
foster output growth, industrialization and full employment.58 -
The most obvious trade-off appears to be between industrial-
ization and employment since more productive employment in
both rural and urban areas is achieved only at the expense
of a lower degree of industrialization as in the case of re-
duced trade protection.
Equity
A similar trade-off characterizes the relationship between
industrialization and functional distribution of income measured
as labour share in GDP. With two important exceptions, all
policies which succeed in restructuring the economy towards
manufacturing industries worsen the functional distribution
for one of the following two reasons. Either, industrialization
goes along with reduced total formal employment as a reaction
to declining factor demand in services, i.e. part of the labour
force is shifted into less well paid informal occupations
(protection). Or, higher formal employment is accompanied by
lower rural wages and by rural-urban migration which reduces
total informal labour income given the negative wage differ-
ential between rural and urban informal employment (export
subsidies).
The two exceptions concern the labour-intensive traditional
consumer goods industries. In this case an export as well as
a production subsidy promotes total manufacturing and improves
the functional distribution. The larger labour share is caused
by a lower interest rate on capital (export subsidy) and/or
by a rather stable or even increased average rural wage rate.
This effect is brought about by a balancing between available
rural jobs and rural labour force through migration. Both
sectoral policy measures also proved to be the only ones
without a trade-off between industrial and income growth.
But this, of course, does not mean that more functional equity
can otherwise only be reached at the expense of lower rates
of income growth. Lower import protection likewise improves
both welfare indicators.59
Concerning the regional distribution of per capita income
the model solutions reflect the regional factor market
distortion which contributed to a regionally unbalanced dis-
tribution of economic activities. Since all industrial activi-
ties except food processing are almost entirely concentrated
in the urban areas and particularly in the urban south, each
sector policy which has a more than negligible impact on in-
dustrialization negatively effects rural per capita incomes
relative to the urban south. The (relative) income gains from
industrialization in the urban south always correspond with
income losses in rural areas which result from the above
described discrimination against the other economic activities.
The resulting income gap is not bridged by migration because,
first, for ethnical and social reasons there is no net migra-
tion between north and south and, secondly, because rural-urban
wage differentials and/or formal employment do not change
sufficiently in the south as a reaction to the policy measures.
If one abstracts from the less interesting cases of declining
over-all per capita income where merely the rate of the slow-
down differs among regions like in (8) and (13), two policies
stand out which definitely improve the regional distribution:
lower import protection to investment goods and an export
subsidy for processed food. These two > policies are decisive
for the positive regional impact of reduced total industrial
protection and of export subsidies to all manufacturing in-
dustries respectively. They similarly diminish the degree of
industrialization and shift factors of production out of
urban areas into rural food processing, services and/or agri-
culture. The remigration is, however, not strong enough to
offset the rural production and income gains which in the case
of the export subsidy were quite substantial. In the urban
south the export subsidy to food processing has such a dis-
astrous effect on industrial production that per capita income
declines in absolute terms while the other policy measure
allows a slight increase due to expanding urban services.- 60
Both policies can nevertheless not prevent that total value
added in the poorest part of the Mexican economy, the rural
south, declines if the liberalized trade regime or export
promotion are extended to all manufacturing industries. The
observed equalization of the regional distribution in the
south is then a case of passive sanitation; rural population
is shrinking faster than rural income. Whether such a solution
is really desirable seems to be questionable since it means
a further concentration of the population in and around the
already overcrowded capital of the country.
To summarize, the emerging dichotomy between industrialization
and functional as well as regional distribution of income has
to be noted when the foreign trade distortion is to be reduced
by policy means. Obviously, distributional goals require more
specific policy interventions which correct for factor market
rather than for foreign trade distortions.
5.2 Factor Market Distortions
To secure a certain minimum standard of living for all members
of the society and to improve working conditions were major
social objectives of the Mexican development strategy. In the
pursuit of these objectives a minimum wage legislation was
enacted already in 19 33 and entrepreneurs are subject to a far-
reaching labour legislation which among other things contains
rather restrictive dismissal regulations.
1
See e.g. W. Bennewitz, Probleme des regionalen Ungleichge-
wichts in Entv/icklungslandern. Dargestellt am Beispiel
 :.
von Mexiko. Diss., Ludwig-Maximilian-Universitat, Miinchen
1968, pp. 191sqq.*~
Such measures protect the employed portions of the labour
force and artifically raise total wage costs over the equi-
librium level. The resulting labour market distortion supports
the substitution of capital for labour. In the parallel attempt
to accelerate industrialization this sector was granted a
number of privileges (see introductory chapter) which sum up
to a subsidy of capital costs thus introducing a capital market
distortion into the Mexican economy. The subsequent chapter
discusses the welfare implications of policy measures suited
to correct the existing distortions. Concerning labour markets
a reduction of minimum wages in urban areas is analyzed because
it seems justified to assume that this regulation constitutes
a more binding constraint to urban entrepreneurial behaviour
than to rural. Since such a policy change is extremely unlikely
to occur the results are merely presented to demonstrate the
social costs associated with minimum wages. A more viable policy
could consist of a wage subsidy to manufacturing industry which
is considered as an equivalent for all kinds of additional
wage costs accruing from social policy. And finally, welfare
implications of a less distorted capital market are studied
under the assumption of a reduced subsidy to capital inputs.
The respective model solutions are presented in Table 6a.
Production and Employment
The way, in which the welfare indicators react to the mentioned
policy changes, confirms once more the old, but nevertheless
often neglected theoretical knowledge that the. alleviation of
one distortion does not necessarily improve economic efficiency
if other distortions exist. While total output and employment
show the expected positive reaction to lower minimum wages
and capital subsidies, a wage subsidy proves to produce output
losses and to increase urban underemployment.Table 6a - ComparatiTe-Static Model Solutionsi Industrial Factor Market Policies
Policy
Lowering
(14) Minimum wage rates




















































Table 6b - Comparative-Static Model Solutions 1 Regional Industrialization Policies
Promoting rural manufacturing
industries by
(17) Production subsidies to the
rural north
(16) Production subsidies to the
rural south
(19) Subsidies for capital inputs
in the rural north
(20) Subsidies for capital inputs
in the rural south
(21) Subsidies for labour inputs
in the rural north
(22) Subsidies for labour inputs









































































































































































































































Lower urban minimum wages and wage subsidies to manufacturing
induce quite diverging changes in the economy. By the first
measure, labour input becomes more profitable in the urban
formal sector and factors of production are withdrawn from all
rural economic activities. In urban areas manufacturing and
services compete for additional labour inputs so that output
expansion of the traded goods is less pronounced than in the
case of a wage subsidy as reflected in the exchange rate
adjustment. The wage subsidy benefits manufacturing activities
both in rural and urban areas and discriminates not only
against agriculture but also against services. The sizeable
expansion of manufacturing output, however, induces a revalua-
tion of the currency which approximately compensates the in-
crease in real terms. Thus, the true winner of the game is
the local good due to the additional industrial intermediate
demand for services, but the respective value added growth
does not prevent slight GDP losses as a consequence of declining
agriculture.
These different output changes immediately explain the employ-
ment effect. Both policies lead to rural-urban migration,
although to a lesser extent in the case of wage subsidies
which also promote rural industries. Since rural wages go up
and rural employment declines, rural underemployment is re-
duced. In urban areas, lower minimum wages result.in a sub-
stantial expansion of formal employment which is able to absorb
the inflow of rural labour and even parts of the existing in-
formal labour force. Wage subsidies, on the other hand, directly
increase merely manufacturing demand for labour and only via
linkages labour inputs of services. Therefore the total effect
on formal employment is more moderate compared to the other
policy and urban informal employment is enlarged. Hence, in
a three sector economy with a labour market distortion a pro-
motion of manufacturing employment alone does not provide an
appropriate tool to mitigate the economic costs attached to
a minimum wage legislation. To compensate the negative income- 65
and employment effects of this policy countermeasures are
required which equally favour all kinds of formal employment,
i.e. a wage subsidy at least to manufacturing and services.
Respective simulations for such a combined strategy which are
not shown in Table 6a, confirm this notion.
To correct distorted factor price relations by an increase
in capital costs of manufacturing (i.e. lower capital sub-
sidies) yields similarly favourable income and employment
effects, however, for entirely different reasons. Higher
capital costs provoke a substitution of labour for industrial
capital, lead to a decline of manufacturing output in physical
terras - particularly in the capital-intensive lines of pro-
duction - and to a decline of exports. The subsequent devalua-
tion of the exchange rate increases domestic consumer prices
of all traded goods, including the agricultural ones, which
on the one hand effects the value share of manufacturing in
GDP in a positive sense and on the other hand induces agri-
cultural factor absorption and output to grow. Both agri-
culture and manufacturing withdraw labour mostly from urban
services so that urban service output and also total formal
employment are reduced and a remigration to rural areas takes
place. There, the additional labour force can be absorbed even
at a higher average wage rate and rural as well as urban under-
employment is diminished.
As a conclusion it is interesting to note that reduced indus-
trial demand for capital inputs, which augments capital supply
to the rest of the economy, strongly favours agricultural
employment and growth at the expense of services and not at
the expense of manufacturing industries. Increasing industrial
capital cost is therefore a policy clearly superior to indus-
trial wage policies in correcting for existing factor market
distortions.- 66 -
Equity
The equity solutions for the minimum wage policy deserve
particular attention because they demonstrate the weakness
of the arguments put forth to justify this legislation. Lower
minimum wages do not only create more employment, as was
already shown, but also a higher over-all labour income which
is reflected in the higher labour share in the enlarged GDP.
This result is achieved in two ways; part of the labour force
is shifted from underemployment and low income occupations
into better paid jobs, which are primarily supplied by the
formal sector of the economyf and another part, the rural
labour force, is able to earn higher incomes than under the
prevailing regulations. These findings underline once more
that minimum wage policies are merely beneficial to that
fraction of the labour force which was lucky enough to obtain
a job in the formal sector; it does not at all secure a certain
minimum standard of living for all members of labour force.
On the contrary, a reduction of those administered wages would
provide more income to more people and there is not trade-off
between growth and equity in this case.
Of course, this as a purely academic statement since nobody
will touch minimum wage in reality for obvious political
reasons. Therefore, some emphasis has to be placed upon the
similarly positive distributional effects of reduced capital
subsidies. Such a policy also has no trade-off between growth
and the functional distribution and, likewise, improves the
regional distribution to the advantage particularly of the
poor rural south. The implicite promotion of agriculture
which is inherent in this measure, raises rural income in the
south to an extent that more people can be employed even at
a higher income. Reducing capital subsidies, therefore, also
contribute to the much desired decentralization of the Mexican
economy while the two labour market policies merely provide
cases of passive sanitations The rural population is better
off than otherv/ise but more people and more economic activities
are concentrated in rural areas.67
5.3 Regional Distortions
A current advice to defeat the increasing regional dualism
in most developing countries consists of programs for rural
industrialization (besides agricultural promotion policies).
Although Mexican governments have placed emphasis on the
regional issue little had been done up to 1970 concerning
rural manufacturing industries and even after 1970, when some
regional tax reliefs and other promotion schemes for rural
industrialization were inaugurated, the.importance of such
measures remained rather limited. This statement has to be
qualified with respect to the Border Industrialization Pro-
gramme which already dates back to 1965. This Programme -
initially restricted to the U.S.-Mexican border, but 1971-72
extended to the whole country except for some highly devel-
oped areas - consists, in essense, in the establishment of
free export processing zones along the border, which attract
labour-intensive lines of U.S. manufacturing production. The
U.S. firms take advantage of the wage differential and of the
U.S. customs regulation (Items 806.30 and 807.00) which
allows an almost duty-free re-export of the processed product
2
to the U.S.. The Programme was rather successful right from
the beginning, but did not get momentum in quantitative terms
before the early seventies. In 1970, value-added and employ-
ment in border industries only amounted to negligible quan-
tities compared to the whole Mexican manufacturing sector
and, more importantly, hardly any information is available
concerning the production characteristics of these industries,
Therefore.- we had to refrain from an analysis of this policy
and just took note of border industries in the input-output
table which contains the indigeneous industrial contribution
to this branch of manufacturing, but does not account for
Mexican labour inouts.
See M. Bruch, Wirtschaftspolitische MaSnahmen in Mexiko zur
Beeinflussung der regionalen Struktur der Verarbeitenden
Industrie, Kiel, October 1977 (mimeo, 36 p.).
2
U.S. tariffs are only applied to value added in Mexico.68 -
Two kinds of rural industrialization policies were, however,
analysed which in fact were applied in Mexico already in
1970, but became more pronounced only after this year: a
general production subsidy to rural manufacturing and a sub-
sidy to capital costs for rural firms. The first measure
reflects federal or state tax preferences granted to upgrade
rural locations for industrial investment which the second
describes the import allowances for capital goods invested
in rural areas. Additionally, the welfare effects of reduced
rural wage costs in manufacturing were quantified since firms
located in rural areas are subject to particular social policy
regulations which oblige firms to make provisions for adequate
housing of workers and even for educational facilities.
The resulting extra labour costs discriminate against the
(generally speaking) more labour intensive rural industries
and spoil the attractiveness of rural locations for further
investment. The most interesting question concerning the above
mentioned policies refers to whether an alleviation of regional
distortions and a subsequent decentralization of manufac-
turing would support a more efficient allocation of resources
in the economy. The welfare indicators presented in Table
6b show that all rural industrial policies except for the
wage policy in the rural north are successful in raising
total and per capita income of the specific region at which
they are directed. But this success in fact has a negative
bearing on all other regions and on the economy as a whole.
Factors of production are basically reallocated between agri-
culture and the urban sector on the one side and rural manu-
facturing as well as rural services on the other side, total
available capital declines since public savings are reduced
due to the subsidies paid, and underemployment either increases
or is merely shifted from urban to rural areas. Industrial
production expands on the v/hole (with one exception correspon-
ding in size to the regional direction of the policy and the
See Bennewitz, op. cit., pp. 183sqq.regional distribution of industrial activities but, since less
factors of production become employed in less productive occu-
pations, net income losses cannot be avoided.
The two exceptional solutions observed for the wage policies
(21, 22) are an outcome of the respective relative size of
rural industries in the north and the south.
Measured in factor input quantities rural industrialization
plays a minor role in the north compared to the south. The
gains to industrialization derived from wage subsidies in the
north are not sufficient to compensate agricultural losses
so that per capita income of the promoted area declines. The
subsidy to southern rural manufacturing, on the other hand,
provokes pronounced reactions of output in physical terms
and subsequently of foreign trade, which induces a consider-
able exchange rate adjustment. The resulting downward movement
of domestic prices for tradables offsets the increments to
physical manufacturing output (an effect v/hich was already
observed earlier) and the industrial share in GDP declines.
These cases, however, do not alter the general conclusion
to be drawn from the model solutions. Rural industrialization
policies should be characterized as policies for income re-
distribution among regions which impose social costs on the
economy. To avoid these costs such policies have to be part
of more comprehensive strategies which provide appropriate
incentives for an efficient allocation of resources among
sectors and among regions.- 70 -
6. Conclusions
With the model presented in this paper a quantification of
the welfare effects of policy interventions in Mexico was
possible. The causation of these effects has been discussed
in the preceding chapters. In the final chapter we shall
identify the more important trade-offs of actual policies
and ask for the alternatives. We condense the model results
into a summary table showing only gains (+) and losses (-)
of selected policies (Table 7).
Mexico has maintained a growth and industrialization policy
since the early 1940s without taking direct measures to
counteract the resulting employment and equity problems.
The problems of social instability facing other developing
countries adhering to rapid industrialization were avoided
by minimum wage and by land reform legislation directly
favouring the two most important collective interest groups,
the urban workers and the ejidatarios.
This places two restrictions on an analysis attempting to
avoid futile exercises. Firstly, the results derived for
minimum wages and land reform can only be taken as expressing
the costs and benefits, but not providing a basis for policy
recommendations. The two policies must be taken as auton-
omous. Secondly, employment and equity goals are not on
the same level with real income and, possibly, industrializ-
ation. It would not be realistic then, to take into con-
sideration employment or equity policies with a (strong)
negative effect on real income. This applies to agricultural
production subsidies, a cereals price guarantee and to public
irrigation investments. These measures are left out of the
summary table. A negative real income effect also occurs in
the case of all regional policies, nevertheless the table














































































The hierarchical position of the industrialization goal is
less obvious since a trade-off between real income and indus-
trialization is not envisaged in policy making. The results
derived for industrial trade and production, for regional as
well as for agricultural development policies, however, clearly
point to a static conflict between the two goals. The conflict
may be resolved dynamically due to differentials in produc-
tivity growth between manufacturing industries and services
depending on the time horizon, although calculations suggest
that this would not occur in the short and medium run. Under
considerations of national self-reliance, a case can still be
made for taking industrialization as a separate goal. Unlike
real income, however, a nonnegative industrialization effect
will not be accepted here as a condition for considering an
alternative policy.
In the case of industrial trade and production policies the
trade-off between real income and industrialization is caused
by the movement of the exchange rate in reaction to the policy
impact on the trade balance. A flexible exchange rate is only
one way of keeping the balance of payments equilibrium, i.e.
one may question the relevance of the results on the trade-off.
On reflection, however, it becomes obvious, that the trade-off
would also occur in the case of a fixed exchange rate with
international capital mobility. Keeping the exchange rate
constant under conditions of an improving trade balance, pro-
duction factors will be absorbed by trading sectors, the
supply of non--tradables will be reduced and prices of non-
tradables will increase. Inflation, therefore, will correct
the domestic price ratio between tradables and non-tradables
in much the same way as a currency appreciation would in the
case of flexible exchange rates. The reverse applies in the,
1
case of a worsening trade balance. In the case of a fixed
exchange rate without international capital instability the
For a detailed analysis see M. Bruno, op.cit.73
balance of payments equilibrium must be kept via trade inter-
ventions. A trade or production policy in favour of one sector
then requires an intervention disfavouring another trading
sector thus avoiding a reallocation of factors between trading
and non-trading sectors. In such a case, the labour distortion
argument would always apply and the trade-off between real
income and industrialization would not occur for trade and
production policies.
The basic package of growth and industrialization policies
in the past consisted of protectionist measures for indus-
trial manufactures on the import side, measures to reduce
the capital costs for industries, export taxes on agricul-
tural products (except cereals) designed to lower domestic
consumption prices and agricultural input policies with the
intention of keeping up the agricultural contribution to the
trade balance. The results show that agricultural policies
on the export as well as on the input side (except irrigation)
in 1970 still have positive real income effects. The import
protection for the separate branches as well as for the total
of manufacturing production, however, has not. Also, a further
reduction in capital costs for the separate branches as v/ell
as for the total of manufacturing production is shown to be
detrimental to real income on account of the induced differ-
entials in marginal capital productivity between manufacturing
industries and services.
Industrial import protection and industrial capital cost
subsidies both have negative effects on real income, on
rural and urban employment, on functional and regional equity,
and - in the case of capital cost subsidies for all manu-
facturing branches ™ also on sectoral equity and industrial-
ization. The model thus leads to a rather clear negative
conclusion with respect to these measures. In the other extreme,
agricultural development policies (except irrigation) combine
positive real income effects with positive employment and74 -
equity effects. Unless industrialization is established as an
overriding goal, the model results lead to a definitely positive
conclusion. The result derived for agricultural exports, in
contrast, is ambivalent as the positive income and industrial-
ization effect is obtained as welfare costs in terms of rural
and urban unemployment as well as functional and sectoral
inequity. Similar effects occur in the case of agricultural
production taxes«
The question for ah alternative to trade and capital cost
policies then arises. The model results point to the promotion
of exports or of production in food processing and in tradi-
tional consumer goods industries ("traditional manufactures")
whereas the same measures applied to industrial intermediates,
chemicals, investment goods and consumer durables ("modern
manufactures") would not help on account of the existing trade
distortion between manufacturing industries. The model thus
confirms the general recommendation for a policy switch to
industrial export diversification. It does, however, restrict
the recommendation to those industries which have been dis-
criminated against by the previous import substitution policy.
Furthermore, the results point to production interventions
for traditional manufactures as an alternative to export
diversification. In practical policy these may be preferred
to export interventions as domestic production incentives do
not provoke the risk of trade retaliations by other countries.
Abstracting from retaliations, however, export promotion proves
to be superior to production promotion. The real income effect
is stronger on account of the smaller impact on the govern-
ment budget. While both measures help to alleviate the rural
underemployment problem and the regional inequity of the rural
north, the export promotion also has positive effects on urban
employment and the more pressing regional equity problem for
the rural south. The exception is a positive effect of produc-
tion promotion on functional equity.™ 75 _
Apart from alternatives to the excessive import-substitution
and capital cost policies, a reversal of these policies also
comes into focus when reviewing the model solutions. Less
restrictive trade practices as well as less distorted industrial
capital costs can successfully support export diversification
not only with respect to income growth but also with respect
to employment creation. Both policy changes show no trade-off
between the two goals and favour functional and regional equity,
too.
Adressing the employment problem specifically, the model results
show that actual trade policies as well as industrial capital
cost reductions add to rural as well as urban underemployment
whereas the agricultural input policies have positive effects
in both dimensions of the problem. As stated, the switbh to
an export promotion policy for traditional manufactures would
be beneficial. The results on industrial labour costs subsidies
confirm the expectations based on the reasoning of Harris-
Todaro: the intervention would worsen the urban problem while
alleviating the rural underemployment. With negative real
income effects and an ambivalent impact on employment, labour
cost subsidies must be ruled out as a viable policy. Neither
can regional industrialization policies be advocated on account
of positive employment effects. The rural effect is negative
in the north and in the south as the policy attracts more labour
into the regions than jobs created. In alleviates the urban
employment problem only in the north whereas in the southern
urban region the outmigration of industries adds to under-
employment. The conclusion on employment arising from the
model is that the problem can only be attacked by an agri-
cultural development policy concentrating on the distribution
of modern inputs and on the diffusion of innovations. The
policy can be assisted, by an export promotion policy for tra-
ditional manufactures, less industrial protection and a reduc-
tion of subsidies to industrial capital.- 76
The results with respect to equity are more complex, as the
equity goal has been split into five dimensions. We shall not
go into the details again. A general conclusion, however,
emerges with respect to sectoral policies. While all industrial
policies (in trade as well as in production, factor inputs
and regional allocation) have costs in terms of worsening
inequities in at least two of the dimensions, a policy of
increasing total agricultural factor productivity has posi-
tive effects in all dimensions and a policy of increasing
the use of modern inputs in agricultural sector has positive
effects in all but one dimension.
These findings require a slight qualification concerning
regional equity. Policies, which improve the standard of living
in rural areas, mostly achieve this goal by passive sanitation.
Of course, this does not make much sense in a country with an
already overpopulated metropolitan area. A reduction of indus-
trial capital subsidies is - aside from lower minimum wages -
the only policy without negative effects on rural income which
succeeds in decentralising economic activities in the sense
that more people can live on higher incomes in rural areas.
In summarizing, the following policy package which avoids
trade-offs between the various economic goals emerges from
the model solutionst
- Agricultural development policies
- Taxes on non-cereal exports
- Export subsidies for traditional manufactures
- Tariff reductions for manufactured imports
- Reductions of industrial capital subsidies.-li-
lt has to be stressed that these policies are selected with
respect to goals which were autonomously defined in the frame-
work of the Mexican political economy. No attempt was made in
this paper to evaluate the implications of these goals or to
establish the congruency between the welfare indicators and
the underlying goals. Such analyses are required, however,
before suggestions can be made on how to implement the above
policy package. An appropriate shaping and timing of the
various measures can be crucial in achieving the necessary
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(Billions of pesos, at current prices)
Product Classification
1 Plant products: cereals
2 " t other
food
3 " " : raw
materials
4 Animal products
Sa Crude oil and natural gas







10 Investment goods and
consumer durables
U Private services (incl.
energy and construction)
12 Public services





































































































































































































































































Source; secretarla de Patrlmonlo y Fomento Industrial - Dlrecclon General de Polltlca » Inversiones Industrlales. X.a estructura de la ofert. y la demai
Banco de Mexico. Cuentas Naclonales y Acervoa de Capital, Consoltdada. y Por Tlpo de Aetivldad Econooica, 1950-1967, Mexico, D.F., 1969. - Bano
la oflclna de Cuentas de Proaucciftn, 1960-1976, Mexico, D.F., 1977>
Secretarla de Industrla y Commerclo - Dlreccl6n General de Estadlstlca, IX Canso Industrial 1971 • Datos da 197O, Mexico, D.F., 1974)
Own computations.
da en Mexico, 1975 - Matrices de Relaciones Intersectorlales. Mexico I978>
o de Mexico - SubdireccUm de Investlaaclon Economlca y Bancarla, Estadlstlcaa de- 83 -
Table A 4 - Elasticities of Production for the Agricultural Subsectors, Mexico 1970;











PF > 5 ha
PF « 5 ha
Ejidos
PF > 5 ha
PF < 5 ha
Ejidos
PF > 5 ha
PF S 5 ha
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PF > 5 ha
















































































































































































































t-values are given in parentheses under each regression coefficient
*•• » denotes significance at 10 7. level
** - " " at 5 Z level
" • " " at 1 Z level
n.s. «• not significant
PF => private farms
Source: Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Ejidal - Direccion General de Estadistica, V Censo Agricola -
Ganaderia y Ejidal, 1970, Resunen General y los tomos de los estados. Mexico, D.F., 1975.
B. Fischer, Ergebnisse von Cobb-Douglas ProduktionsfunktionsschStzungen fur die mexikanische
Landwirtschaft, November 1978 (mimeo., 22 p.).Table A 5 - Elasticities of Substitution (a) and Labour Shares ($) in Value Added in





























































Source; Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, Direccion General de Estadfstica, IX Censo
Industrial 1971: Datos de 1970. Mexico, D.F., 1974. - Own Computations.
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00Table A 6 - A 'Complete' Scheme of Urban Private Demand in Mexico, 1970
Product group
i ^\_^
1 Plant products: cereals



































Own and cross price elasticities
1 2 4 6 5 7 9 10 11
Plant Processed Tradi- Investment
J
a
n products: Animal food „. . tional r)l(,mir,1(, goods and Private
products: , , Mining uiemxcals
, other products beverages, consumer consumer services
ppypa1c?
food tobacco goods durables
000000 000
0 -0.3998 0 O -O.O243 -O.O658 -O.O1O4 -O.O337 -O.O76O
O O -O.7143 O -0.0434 -O.1177 -O.O186 -0.0602 -O.1358
O O 0 -O.34O8 -O.O2O7 -0.0561 -O.OO89 -O.O287 -O.O648
-O.O24O -0.0263 -O.O26O -O.1532 -O.2291 -0.0712 -O.O113 -0.0367 -O.O822
-0.0551 -O.O61O -O.O6OO -0.3554 -O.O61O -0.6356 -O.O262 -O.O85O -0.1907
-0.0663 -O.O736 -O.O722 -O.4276 -O.O734 -0.1990 -O.5969 -O.1O18 -O.2292
-0.0510 -O.O56O -O.O55O -0.3250 -O.O557 -0.1511 -0.0239 -0.5076 -O.1747
-O.O4OO -0.0440 -0.0431 -0.2553 -O.O44O -0.1187 -O.O199 -0.0608 -O.4751
Note: * Calculated from Engel aggregation.
Source: Secretaria de Industria y de Comercio - Direccion General de Estadistica, Ingresos y Egresos de las Familias en la
Republica Mexicana 1969-1970. Tomo III-V, Mexico, D.F., 1971; own computations.
00Table A 7 - A 'Complete' Scheme of Rural Private Demand in Mexico, 1970
Product group
i ^v^
1 Plant products: cereals



































Own and cross price elasticities
12 4 6 5 7 9 1O 11
Plant Processed Tradi- Investment
products: Animal food . . tional . , goods and Private
products: . . Mining Chemicals *
other products beverages, consumer consumer services
foods tobacco goods durables
-O.1192 0 0 0 -O.OO32 -0.0199 -O.OO5O -O.OO5O -O.O177
0 -0.4279 O O -O.O113 -0.0713 -0.0179 -O.O18O -0.0636
0 0 -O.7644 0 -0.0203 -0.1274 -0.0320 -0.0322 -0.1137
O 0 0 -0.4467 -O.OO89 -0.0561 -0.0141 -0.0142 -0.O5OO
-0.1014 -0.1705 -0.1707 -0.4164 -O.441O -0.2128 -0.0535 -0.0537 -0.1898
-0.0869 -0.1490 -0.1463 -0.3569 -0.0290 -0.5313 -0.0459 -0.0460 -0.1627
-0.0529 -0.0890 -O.O891 -0.2174 -0.0177 -0.1111 -0.2404 -0.0280 -0.0991
-O.O59O -0.0993 -0.0994 -0.2425 -0.0197 -0.1239 -0.0312 -0.2684 -0.1106
-0.0847 -O.1424 -O.1426 -0.3478 -O.O283 -0.1777 -0.0447 -0.0448 -0.4986
Note: * Calculated from Engel aggregation.
Source: See Table A6.
I
00